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I. INTRODU<::TION

"Ohio has no legislative history." Have you heard someone say this recently?
Perhaps another attorney, a law student, or even a lobbyist or legislator?
Perhaps you have said it yourself, sagely and confidently? If you are so sure,

1B.S., The Ohio State University; M.A., The University of Chicago; J.D., 1998, The
Ohio State University College of Law. I am particularly grateful to Professor James J.
Brudney of the Ohio State University College of Law for encouraging me to write about
the creation and use oflegislative history in Ohio, and for his comments and suggestions
on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank Nancy Rapoport, DennisPapp, Tatia Gibbons,
Ann Thielke, and Alan Wernick for their comments. I thank the staff of Ohio Legislative
Service Commission for their patience and cooperation as I studied Ohio legislative
process, particularly Shelagh Baker, who provided valuable guidance and training. Any
errors are my own.
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how do you know? If Ohio has no legislative history, what is it that the Ohio
Supreme Court and other Ohio courts have been using and referring to as
legislative history in at least fifty cases since 1980?
Why do commentators persist in the belief that there is no legislative history
in Ohio when there are so many contrary signals? Does it have something to
do with a limited definition of legislative history? Is there a misunderstanding
about the link between different political cultures and the records kept within
those cultures? Are we in the midst of a time lag before lawyers in Ohio
recognize Ohio's particular form of legislative history? Do some lawyers have
inside information that others do not have access to? Or are many instead
ignoring what is both obvious and readily available?
In this article I will explore what seems to be a prevailing formal view about
Ohio legislative history, and the contradictory signals expressed by the Ohio
Revised Code and the courts, particularly the Ohio Supreme Court. State
statutes are not created in a vacuum. The state legislature has a professional
staff. Records are made and preserved. These records include not only all
versions of bills, but also analyses of these bills and of their impact on existing
law. Ohio courts often cite these records and analyses in decisions.
The true story about Ohio's legislative history was never simple, and it is
now a story in the process of change. Telling the story is like putting together
a puzzle, except the pieces of this puzzle won't arrive in one box.
In Part Two, I consider the prevailing assumptions about legislative history
in Ohio. In Part Three, I examine the reality of judicial use of legislative history
in Ohio; Part Four describes the Ohio Legislative Service Commission and its
non-partisan legislative staff. Part Five compares federal and Ohio legislative
history, and argues that Ohio's legislative process and history are rooted in its
political culture. In Part Six, I look at the accessibility of Ohio legislative history
and the identities of the lawyers who have used Ohio legislative history in their
arguments before courts. When I conclude, I hope to have convinced you to
view these things through altered lenses and to consider a different possibility:
there is legislative history in Ohio after all.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN OHIO - THE FORMAL VIEW: COMMON PERCEPTIONS
AND CONTRADICTORY SIGNALS

There is an assumption in recent commentaries on Ohio statutes that Ohio
legislative history does not exist.2 A 1991law review note declares that "due to
the lack of legislative history in Ohio, it is impossible to ascertain exactly what
the Ohio legislators contemplated when they passed the Pattern of Corrupt

2See, e.g., Benson A. Wolman, Separation Anxiety: Free Exercise Versus Equal
Protection, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 453,462 (1986) (although criticizing the federal district court's
literal reading of an Ohio statute and noting the court's reference to "the absence of any
legislative history ... ;" the author does not challenge the court's statement regarding
the absence of legislative history).
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Activities Law."3 The author then refers the reader to an earlier footnote where
he makes use of Comments in the Legislative Service Commission (LSC)
Summary of Enactments describing the expected effect of the new law.4 Here
the author diligently tracks down what Ohio courts have in fact referred to as
legislative history, but he does not acknowledge it as legislative history.5 The
author may not know the value of what he has found or he may have a different
opinion about the identity of what he has used. Alternatively, perhaps the
Summary of Enactments was not helpful or enlightening in this instance.
In another recent article, a different commentator stated there is no
legislative history in Ohio,6 and cited a 1971 case, State v. Dickinson,7 as support.
Using Ohio's perceived lack of history as a contrast, the commentator later
analyzed the legislative history of a closely related federal statute.S
It is important to put the Dickinson decision in proper perspective; Dickinson
deserves to be demystified. At issue in Dickinson was the intent of the legislature
regarding the definition of the word "another" in the vehicular homicide
statute.9 The Ohio Supreme Court first examined the grammatical construction
of section 4511.181 of the Ohio Revised Code to determine if a viable unborn
fetus was within the scope of the phrase "the death of another" in a vehicular
homicide law. It determined that the word "another" was used by the General
Assembly with reference to the word "person" in the first part of the sentence,
"No person shall deliberately cause the death of another." 10 The court consulted
section 451l.Ol(V), which defined person as "every natural person" and was in
pari materia with section 4511.181, and then consulted Webster's Dictionary,
which defined "natural" as existing from birth. These sources indicated that the

3Donald Cosmo Ligorio, Note, Ohio's Pattern of Corrupt Activities Law: Ohio Revised
Code Sections 2923.31-.36, 17 DAYTON L. REv. 279,284 n.43 (1991) (comparing Ohio law,
federal law, and the law of other states regarding racketeering).
4Jd. at 281, n.l2. The Summary of Enactments the author refers to is a summary of
Legislative Service Commission analyses of bills enacted during each General Assembly
and published by LSC. Id. Bill analyses will be described and discussed extensively later
in this article.

5See id. at 280,281,284, 304 n.160.
6See Max Kravitz, Ohio's Administrative License Suspension: A Double jeopardy and
Due Process Analysis, 29 AKRON L. REv. 123 (1996).
7State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1971).

BSee Kravitz supra note 6, at 159-63; see also Thomas R. Goots, Comment, "A Thug
in Prison Cannot Shoot Your Sister": Ohio Appears Ready to Resurrect the Habitual Criminal
Statute-Will it Withstand an Eighth Amendment Challenge? 28 AKRON L. REv. 253, 270 &
n.121 (1995)(asserting a lack of state legislative history).

9See Dickinson, 275 N.E.2dat600 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4511.181 (Anderson
1990)). The vehicular homicide statute is now found in sections 2903.06-.07.
10Jd.
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General Assembly did not intend the word "person" to include a viable unborn
fetus.ll
The court then went on to make the following statement: "To substantiate
this intent, this court will look beyond the statute. . . . Further, since no
legislative history of statutes is maintained in Ohio, we must look to the source
of the statute and to judicial pronouncements to determine the meaning of the
word in question."12 There is no evidence in the lower court decisions of any
attempt to introduce legislative history, so apparently none was rejected.13
Interestingly, after the court remarked that no legislative history is
maintained in Ohio, it proceeded in the next paragraph to discuss the history
of section 4511.181 and how this history indicated that there had been little
change in the pertinent wording of this statute since it first became law.l4 The
court was looking at earlier versions of the homicide statute, going back in time
to the laws of Northwest Territory, and also to the 1935 Ohio statute that created
the additional offense of manslaughter in the second degree .IS
One might surmise that the court was referring to another type of legislative
history when it declared that none was maintained in Ohio. The previous
version of a law is a type of legislative history, and this type of history is
maintained in Ohio.l6
Absent from Dickinson is a citation to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision one
term earlier in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Eaton. The court in Eaton refused to rely
upon a particular bill analysis from LSC as evidence of legislative intent in that
instance.17 The Dickinson court does not cite Eaton as authority, and there is no
evidence that a LSC bill analysis was offered in argument.

llJd.
l2Jd.
13 See State v. Dickinson, 248 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio Misc. 1969), rev'd, 263 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1970).
l4See Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d at 600.
l5Jd. at 601 & n.3.
l6See DAVID M. GOLD, OHIO LEG. SERV. COMM'N, A GUIDEW LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
0HI03.
A researcher may begin the examination of a statute's legislative
history by comparing the statute in question with its predecessor
or successor acts. The versions of the Revised Code published by
Anderson and Baldwin include after each section citations to earlier
codifications and to the session laws that enacted or amended the
section .... Until1927, the session laws did not indicate the changes
in existing law made by each new act; to determine what they were
the researcher must set the old and new laws side by side and
compare them.
Id.
17Cleveland Trust Co. v. Eaton, 256 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio 1970) (reporting that a LSC bill
analysis was offered as evidence of legislative intent by appellee Eaton's attorneys, and
was rejected as such by the court). See discussion infra Part III.
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A number of clues in Dickinson suggest that the court was talking about a
detailed legislative record of commentary on a pending bill similar to that
generated by Congress when it stated that no legislative history was
maintained in Ohio. It did look at past versions of statutes, and thus could not
have meant that Ohio did not keep records of old versions of statutes. It did
not refer to the recent Eaton decision, so it may not have been rejecting that
particular form of history.lB
Numerous authors have used LSC bill analyses and other LSC sources to aid
in understanding a new development in state law. Most of these authors use
the sources without making definitive statements about whether or not
legislative history exists in Ohio. One author stands out by directly
acknowledging LSC bill analyses as helpful in determining legislative intent.l9
In 1983 and 1985, commentators demonstrated familiarity with LSC sources.20
In 1994 and 1995, commentators referred to LSC documents for information
about legislation.21 Several out-of-state journals have cited LSC interim
research reports as part of nationwide surveys on broad topics.22 Law journal
student notes make use of LSC materials to understand recent development in
the law; some use the LSC materials to understand the legislative intent
without explicitly acknowledging the source as legislative history.23 Others

18Contrast this with Max Kravitz's article citing Dickinson. Perhaps Kravitz meant
that Ohio did not have legislative history comparable in scope and scale to that of
Congress. He may also have believed that the appropriate standard for legislative
history was a federal standard, and Ohio and federal legislative history are not the same
in format, scope or quantity. See generally Kravitz, supra note 6.
19 See James Leonard, A Select Annotated Bibliography ofOhio Practice Materials, 17 OHio
N.U.L. REv. 265,270-72 (1991) (describing the research sources in Ohio that are useful
for determining legislative intent and including LSC bill analyses as useful sources).

20See Charles E. Wilson, The Replacement of Lawful Economic Strikers in the Public Sector
in Ohio,46 OHIO ST. L.J. 639,664 & n.175 (1985) (citing an interview with a LSC research
associate); James T. O'Reilly and Neil Gath, Structures and Conflicts: Ohio's Collective
Bargaining Law for Public Employees, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 891,909, 918 (1983) (citing LSC bill
analyses).
21See Louis F. Lobenhofer, Limited Liability Entities in Ohio: A Primer on the Limited
Liability Company and Partnership with Limited Liability, Their Substantive and Tax Aspects,
21 OmoN.U.L. REv. 39, 102n.515 (1994);TeriG. Rasmussen, New Laws Governing Checks
and Negotiable Instruments Under U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4: What Does it Mean to Financial
Institutions in Ohio? 24 CAP. U.L. REv. 507, 511 n.7 (1995).
22See Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27, 40 n.52
(1984) (citing Ohio Legislative Service Staff Research Report No. 46 on Capital
Punishment, 1961); Yao Apasu-Gbotsu, Survey, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the
Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 655 (1986) (citing a Ohio
Legislative Service Commission Summary of a part of the new criminal code, 1972).
23 See Susan R. Bell, Comment, Ohio Gets Tough on Juvenile Crime: An Analysis of Ohio's
1996 Amendments Concerning the Bindover of Violent Juvenile Offenders to the Adult System
and Related Legislation, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 207, 223 n.141, 229 n.195 (1997); Julian B. Bell
III, Comment, Ohio's Lemon Law: Ohio Joins the Rest of the Nation in Waging War Against
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refer to LSC staff without an understanding of their role in the legislative
process.24 Finally, a commentator recently accused the LSC Division of Code
Revision of making an error because Ohio law was different from the law in
most other states.25 These commentaries illustrate a lack of agreement about
how to classify and describe what is available in Ohio. Moreover, the prevailing
statements that are specifically directed at the existence of legislative history in
Ohio ignore two elements actually used by courts: prior versions of bills and
LSC bill analyses.
Ill. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN OHIO - THE REALITY

In the same year as the Dickinson opinion, Ohio legislators were writing into
the General Provisions of the Ohio Revised Code some new rules of statutory
construction. In September of 1971, the General Assembly passed section 1.49,
which allows courts to consider legislative history among other things when
determining legislative intent.26 The bill was passed on September 20, 1971,
signed and approved by the governor on October 4, 1971, to be effective
January 3, 1972. The Ohio Supreme Court decided Eaton on March 4,1970 and
Dickinson on Nov. 24, 1971. The LSC bill analyses for each version of the bill do
not state that the law is a response to a particular judicial decision, but do state

the Automobile Limited Warranty, 57 U. ON. L. REv. 1015, 1029 n.97 (1989); Dominick
Cirelli, Jr., Comment, Utilizing School Voucher Programs to Remedy School Financing
Problems, 30 AKRON L. REv. 469,500 n.30 (1997); Kyle A. Knapp, Comment, One Cannot
Serve Two Masters: Solving the Inherent Conflicts of Interest in Statutory Legal Counsel for
Ohio School Boards, 26 CAP. U.L. REv. 141, 166; Matthew Devery McCormack, Comment,
Tracking Ohio Insurance Coverage: The Genesis and Demise of Savoie, 20 DAYTON L. REv.
293, 328 (1994); Douglas Schwartz, Comment, The Tortured Path ofOhio's Collateral Source
Rule, 65 U. ON. L. REv. 643, 659 nn.148 & 150 (1997); Elizabeth J. Watters, Comment,
State v. Collins: Is the Impossible Now Possible in Ohio? 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 307, 320 & n.95
(1990).

24See Judith Lynn Bick Rice, Note, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial
Insemination by Donors, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055,1065 n.l19, 1071 n.171, 1072 (1985) (stating
at one point that there is no legislative history in Ohio, then later describing LSC staff
as drafting its own legislation and making recommendations to the members about the
content of bills).

25See Bruce A. Campbell, Trouble: Ohio's Non-Uniform Definitions of Accommodation
and Accommodated Parties in Revised Article Three ofthe Uniform Commercial Code and What
to do About Them, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 319, 325 (1997).
26Section 1.49 of the Ohio Revised Code regarding "ambiguous terms" reads:
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
legislature, may consider among other matters: (A) the object sought
to be attained; (B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (C) The legislative history; (D) The common law or former
statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects;
(E) The consequences of a particular construction; (F) The administrative construction of the statute.
OHio REv. CODE ANN.§ 1.49 (Anderson 1990). Section 1.49 does not define "legislative
history" and that term is not defined elsewhere in the Ohio Revised Code.
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that the law "revised the definitions and rules of statutory construction which
are applicable to the entire Revised Code."27 The session laws do not provide
intent language for the statute, but section 1.49 is newly enacted law rather than
amended law.28
According to a historical record compiled by David Gold in 1985, Ohio courts
have used various sources for legislative history, even prior to 1971.29 In 1841,
the Ohio Supreme Court examined the history of a statute to determine the
intention of the legislature, and found that history in the House and Senate
Joumals.30 The House and Senate Journals, although providing a limited
record, have always been respected and have been given more weight than any
other source of legislative history, except prior versions of the statutes.31
Gold demonstrates the courts' use of other types of sources, ranging from
predecessor statutes, session laws which show deleted and new language,32
the title of an act,33 headings given to a statute,34 special studies and research
reports produced by LSC, LSC bill analyses, and the Summary of Enactments.35
These sources are formally produced during the legislative process.36 The
courts have occasionally cited other sources or records that are "official in

27 See LSC Bill Analyses of H.R. 607, for H. Third Reading; Am. H.R. 607 for H. Third
Reading and S. Judiciary; and Am. H.R. 607 for H. Third Reading, S. Judiciary and S.
Third Reading, 109th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 1971).
28See 1972 Ohio Laws 134.

29 See GOLD, supra note 16, at 2.
3D See State ex rei. Peters v. McCollister, 11 Ohio 46,56 (1841). "I am aware that every
statute should speak for itself, and be constructed by itself; but if there be doubt as to
its construction, resort may be had to extraneous matters, and nothing of this kind is
more satisfactory than the journals of the body by which it was enacted." Id.
31See GoLD supra note 16, at 7, 8. The House and Senate Journals are published each
day that the chamber is in session. They record the procedural actions taken on bills:
introductions, referrals to and reports by committees, floor motions, and votes. The
Journals print the sponsors and titles of bills, but not the full texts. They do furnish the
texts of amendments either recommended by the reporting committee, or proposed on
the floor, with deletions indicated by strike-throughs and insertions shown by capital
letters. According to Gold, "Reliance on the Journals for legislative history has never
been questioned." Id.

32Jd. at 3.
33Jd. at 4.
34Jd. at 5.

35 Id. at 9. A bill analysis is written for every version of a bill introduced. The Summary
of Enactments is published for each Assembly, and provides a synopsis of all bills
enacted since the previous Summary. A condensed form of the analysis of the enacted
bill in included in the Summary and is often referred to by courts as the LSC "Comment"
or "Summary." The Summary of Enactments is now called the Digest of Enactments; the
change took effect for the 122nd General Assembly. See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, A
GUIDEBOOK FOR OHIO LEGISLATORS 56-58 (6th ed. 1997) (hereinafter GUIDEBOOK].
36See Cow, supra note 16, at 10.
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nature but not prepared under authority of the General Assembly" such as a
uniform act or model law, the interpretation of federal law when Ohio law is
based upon it, and laws of other states when Ohio has adopted provisions from
that state.37 The courts have considered some "unofficial or quasi-official"
sources, such as "statements of sponsoring legislators, bar committee reports,
recommendations of administrative officers, and contemporaneous
construction by the legal profession."38
Ohio courts have increasingly used LSC bill analyses over the past two
decades. Since the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Meeks v. Papadopulos39 in
1980, both the supreme court and lower courts have relied on the bill analyses
by the General Assembly's non-partisan professional legislative staff at the
Ohio Legislative Service Commission as evidence of legislative intent and have
described the bill analyses as legislative history.40
The first noteworthy mention of LSC bill analyses was in 1970. Attorneys for
the defendant in Eaton attempted to use a LSC analysis to argue about the
intention of words used in a statute. The court expressed a preference for
relying on the plain meaning of the text as its rule of construction when the text
is plain and unambiguous.41 The court responded to the LSC bill analysis,
called a "report" by the court, by stating its opinion that "a report of the LSC,
with respect to proposed legislation, may not be used to give meaning to a
legislative enactment other than that which is clearly expressed by the General

37See id. at 11.
38See id. at 12. Researchers will find the published sources are widely available. These
are the House and Senate Journals (and the Bulletin, an index to the Journals), and the
Summary or Digest of Enactments. In addition, LSC keeps all versions of bills introduced
on file for four years; microfilm of older bills are kept in the LSC library, the Supreme
Court Library, the Ohio State University (OSU) College of Law Library, and the state
archives of the Ohio Historical Society. The microfilmed records of all version of bills
introduced go back to the 68th General Assembly or 1886. LSC bill analyses of bills
introduced have been microfilmed and retained since 1961 and are available at the LSC
library, the Supreme Court Library, and the OSU College of Law library. The Supreme
Court Library also maintains hard copies of bill analyses from 1991 to the present. An
on-line news service called Hannah Information Systems carries the text of bills
introduced and the bill analysis of the enacted versions of the bill. The LSC library is open
to the public but maintained by the General Assembly primarily for the use of legislators; the
General Assembly has not provided staff to assist other researchers. Interview with Debbie
Tavenner, LSC Library Administrator, in Columbus, Ohio Ouly 28,1997). Notes of all
interviews herein are on file with author.
39Meeks v. Papadopulos, 404 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1980).

40See William J. Heaphy, III, Judicial Use of LSC Analyses, Summaries, and Reports as
"Legislative History," presented at a Public Practice Continuing Legal Education
Seminar, October 18, 1996, (reporting an increase in the mention of LSC documents in
court opinions during the period from approximately 1970 to 1996 ). Meeks was also cited
in GOLD, supra note 16, at 9 n.26.
41Eaton, 256 N.E.2d at 204 (Ohio 1970).
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Assembly."42 Then, after acknowledging that the LSC report in question was
"distributed to members of the General Assembly, to the press and to others
interested in the proposed act" it went on to say that the LSC Comment "was
not made a part of the record of the General Assembly and has not otherwise
been published and is not generally available even in the best of the law
libraries in this state."43 The Ohio Supreme Court was clearly mistrustful, but
left open the possibility of relying upon bill analyses under different
circumstances, such as ambiguous text.
LSC bill analyses were mentioned in at least seven decisions between 1970
and 1980, but the significant change in direction came in 1980.44 In Meeks, the
court responded quite differently to the prosecuting attorney's proffer of a LSC
bill analysis to aid in construing a recently enacted law.45 The court noted that
disagreement between the trial and appellate courts indicated that the statute's
language was ambiguous.46 It then noted that the legislature, in enacting
section 1.49 of the Ohio Revised Code, had explicitly permitted courts to
consider legislative history, in order to help it determine the intention of the
legislature. The LSC bill analysis was described as an
analysis of [the House Bill] during the time it was introduced, voted
upon, and passed by the Ohio Senate and House of Representatives.
Although this court is not bound by such analyses, we may refer to
them when we find them helpful and objective. This legislative history
indicates that the Commission, in analyzing the bill ... informed the
members of the General Assembly that Sub.H.B. 201 excluded [certain]
"public employers" from statutory coverage.47
The court also cited Ohio common law, holding that "statutes are to be read in
the light of attendant circumstances and conditions, and are to be construed as

42Jd.

43 Id. The court had relied on the House and Senate Journals of the General Assembly
in the past, see supra note 30. Courts may refer to LSC bill analyses as reports, comments,
or summaries. A bill analysis has a Comment subsection, and the Summary or Digest
of Enactments contain excerpts from bill analyses of enacted bills.
44See Heaphy, supra note 40, at 30-33 (listing cases prior to Meeks where the court
referred to LSC documents for additional information about a statute). See, e.g., State ex
rei. Cincinnati Bell v. Industrial Comm'n, 378 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ohio 1982); Wiliams v.
Akron, 374 N.E.2d 1378, 1382 n.2 (Ohio 1978); State v. Lockett, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1071
(Ohio 1976); ITI Canteen Corp. v. Porterfield, 283 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ohio 1972); Weiss v.
Porterfield, 271 N .E.2d 792, 794 (Ohio 1971 ). In these cases the Supreme Court used LSC
documents in its analysis but did not describe them as "legislative history."
45See Meeks, 404 N.E.2d at 162 (Ohio 1980).
46Jd.
47Jd. (emphasis added).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

9

58

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:49

they were intended to be understood when they were passed,"48 as further
support for use of the LSC bill analysis.
The Meeks court called attention to LSC bill analyses as legislative history in
three different ways. First, it directly referred to a LSC bill analysis as legislative
history. Second, it indicated that the bill analysis was helpful and objective in
the context of construing an ambiguous statute. Third, it implied that the LSC
bill analysis was a relevant "attendant circumstance" when it relied on case law
to support the use of attendant circumstances surrounding the enactment of
the statute.49 Since Meeks was decided, LSC documents have been cited in over
45 Ohio Supreme Court cases, 93 appellate court cases, 56 unreported appellate
court cases, and 10 miscellaneous cases, often as evidence of legislative intent
and as "legislative history."50
Ohio courts use LSC bill analyses to serve three principal objectives. These
are A) to confirm and support the court's reading of the plain meaning of the
text; B) to aid in construing ambiguities in the text by searching for the intent
of the legislature; and C) to contribute to the court's understanding of the
purpose of the legislation.51 I have chosen fourteen recent examples from the
Ohio Supreme Court to illustrate how judicial reliance on LSC analyses serves
each of these three objectives. 52

A. Use ofLSC Bill Analyses to Confirm the Plain Meaning of the Text

In Felton v. Felton, the question was whether a court may issue a domestic
protection order even when the parties have already agreed to a no-harassment
provision in a separation agreement. 53 Initially the court noted that the statute
granting the right to ex parte hearings to issue a temporary protection order
provided in plain language that the remedies "are in addition to, and not in lieu

48Jd. (quoting Miller v. Fairley, 48 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1943)).

49Meeks, 404 N.E.2d at 162.

50 See Heaphy, supra note 40 (partial list). In addition, I conducted a boolean search
on LEXIS, using the search terms "Legislative Service Commission," which retrieved a
total of 213 cases through 1997, including all cases where the phrase was mentioned, for
a total of 54 Ohio Supreme Court cases, including Eaton and its progeny, 92 appellate
court cases, 55 unreported appellate court cases, and 10 miscellaneous cases. Search of
Lexis, States Library, OHCTS File (Mar. 22, 1998).
51Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 353 & n.123 (1990) (illustrating, by use of a "funnel of
abstraction," the "hierarchy of sources" a judge could rely upon when interpreting a
statute, beginning with text as the most authoritative source; then, going up the funnel,
evidence of legislative intent in the legislative history; "imaginative reconstruction" of
what the legislature would have done if it had known of the problem facing the court;
the purpose or mischief the statute was designed to remedy; and, a search for the "best
answer" to the problem).

521 limited my total search to the end of 1997. Thirteen of these cases are discussed
in the text and one is presented in a footnote.
53 Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio 1997).
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of, any other available civil or criminal remedies."54 Thus, protection orders
were not precluded by the dissolution decree. The LSC bill analysis of the
enacted bill stated that "[t]he General Assembly enacted the domestic violence
statutes specifically to criminalize ... domestic violence and to authorize a
court to issue protection orders designed to ensure the safety and protection of
a complainant in a domestic violence case."55 The court reasoned that this
extensive authority was intentionally granted to trial courts so that they could
tailor protection orders for victims of domestic violence, in contrast to the
general nature of the authority granted to courts by the dissolution decree's
no-harassment provision.56 The protection orders also granted protective
features not found in a dissolution decree, which the court elaborated upon in
detaii.57 The plain language of the statute supported the courts findings, but
the court of appeals had ruled that the protection order was superfluous when
a no-harassment provision existed. The court used the LSC analysis for
emphasis and support of its construction of the statute's plain language.58
In State v. Moaning, the issue was whether the legislature intended to prohibit
a person who had been convicted of attempted drug abuse, and not actual
possession or use, from carrying a firearm, under the statute that prohibited
having a weapon while under disability.59 The court looked at the statute's
language to ascertain intent, and then decided its interpretation was consistent
with the LSC analysis, which the court found "persuasive to the extent that it
provide[ d) insight into the legislature's analysis when drafting the law."60 The
court believed the LSC comment showed that the legislature intended to
broaden the scope of the disability statute to include those individuals.61
Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Utilities Commission of Ohio was an appeal
by OCC of an application for a rate increase granted by PUCO to a small
telephone company.62 One of the issues was whether the legislature actually

54Jd. at 674.

55 Id. (omissions in original).
56 Id. at 675.
57Jd. at 675-76.

58 See Felton, 679 N.E.2d at 672, 674.
59Statev. Moaning,666 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 1996); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §2923.13-.14
(Anderson 1990 & Supp. 1997).

60Moaning, 666 N.E.2d at 1116.
61 See id. (quoting LSC bill analysis of Section 2923.13 of the Ohio Revised Code, "This
section is similar to a former prohibition against weapons in the hands of bad risks,
including fugitives, certain felons, drug dependent persons, alcoholics, and mental
incompetents. The section expands upon the former law by including within the
prohibition persons under indictment for or who have been convicted of any felony of
violence or any drug abuse offense." (emphasis added, alteration in original).
620ffice of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 638 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio
1994).
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intended to dispense with the notice and hearing requirements in the
ratemaking process for small telephone companies, in contrast to the
traditional ratemaking process, where ratepayers and the OCC did
participate.63 The court held that the legislature departed from the traditional
ratemaking process of quasi-judicial hearings and had delegated authority to
PUCO to exempt small telephone companies entirely when it enacted section
4927.04(B).64 This exemption made the process for these small companies
legislative, with no opportunity for notice and hearing. The court used the LSC
bill analysis, which confirmed the intent to dispense with notice and hearing
for small telephone company ratemaking, to support its reading of the
statute.65
In Harris v. Atlas Single-Ply Systems, the issue was whether the language of
the statute of limitations regarding unpaid minimum wages could be applied
to require that the Department of Industrial Relations bring an action on behalf
of employees for the payment of prevailing wages within two years.66 The
majority used the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, reasoning that
section 2305.11(A) expressly mentioned unpaid overtime compensation and
unpaid wages, but was silent with respect to prevailing wages. This suggested
to the court a legislative intent to exclude the term. The court added that
minimum wage laws and prevailing wage laws were enacted with different
purposes in different chapters of the code.67 The concurring opinion cited an
earlier decision, including a quote of the LSC summary of the bill, to conclude
that any limitation periods in section 2305.11 applied only when a prevailing
wage violation existed, and did not apply in this case.68
State ex rei. v. Voinovich was a challenge to the constitutionality of a workers'
compensation appropriations bill, where two of the four issues presented were
whether the bill violated the three-consideration provision and the one-subject
rule of the Ohio Constitution.69 The dissent argued that the original simple
appropriations bill now contained "massive substantive law changes to the
workers compensation system," including changes to the structure of the
administration, limitations on the authority of the Industrial Commission,

63 See id. at 554.

64Jd.
65 See id. The court also quoted from and relied on testimony on behalf of the Ohio
Telephone Association to support its construction of the intent of the statute and PUCO' s
regulations. Id. Records of testimony before committees are not retained in a consistent
manner in Ohio.
66Harris v. Atlas Single-Ply Sys., 593 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio 1992).

67Jd. at 1378;seealso0moREv.CoDEANN. §2305.1l(a)(Anderson 1990 &Supp. 1997).
68Harris, 593 N.E.2d at 1378 (quoting Harris v. Van Hoose,550 N.E.2d 461,463 (Ohio
1990).
69 See State ex rei. v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994). See also Am.Sub.H.R. 107,
120th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 1995).
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elimination of regional boards, limitations on rights of injured workers,
incentives for employer resistance, changes in standard of proof for tort claims,
and privatization of the rehabilitation program?O The dissent found that the
"magnitude of the changes by the legislation is demonstrated by the LSC
Comparison of Current and Prior Workers' Compensation Law and Provisions
of Am. Sub.H.B.107. It takes twenty pages to list the changes made by the bill."71
The dissent used House and Senate Journals, as well as the LSC analysis
contrasting existing law with proposed changes, and case law, in its argument
that the bill was logrolling, "the practice by which several matters are
consolidated in a single bill for the purpose of obtaining passage for proposals
which would never achieve a majority if voted on separately,"72 and that the
legislature was violating the one-subject rule?3
B. Use of LSC Bill Analyses to Search for the Intent of the Legislature

In State v. Williilms, the sole issue was whether there was sufficient evidence
that appellee and appellant were family or household members, as defined by
statute, in order to convict appellee of violating a domestic violence statute?4
The court held that the offense of domestic violence arose out of the relationship
of the parties rather than out of their living circumstances.75 The statute
protected "family or household members," which included cohabitants, but
"cohabitant" was not defined?6 Appellee argued that cohabitation required
that the two had lived together. The court's reasoning began with its reference
to a case decided earlier the same year that had cited a LSC bill analysis. That
analysis said that "the General Assembly enacted the domestic violence statutes
specifically to criminalize those activities commonly known as domestic
violence ...."77 The court then looked at research studies of domestic violence
victims, which established that the offense arose out of the relationship itself,
and not out of the sharing of the same address?B The court reasoned that
because the General Assembly recognized the special nature of domestic
violence by providing special protections such as temporary protection orders,
it clearly believed that assault on or by a family or household member deserved

70See Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d at 601.
71Jd.

72 Id. at 602 (quoting Hoover v. Board of Franklin County Commissioners, 482 N .E.2d.
575,580 (Ohio 1985) which cited the definition of logrolling in State ex ref. Dix v. Celeste,
464 N.E.2d. 153 (Ohio 1984)).
73 Id. at 601-02.
74State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126,1127 (Ohio 1997).
75Jd. at 1129.

76See OHio REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2919.25 (Anderson 1997).

77See Williams, 683 N.E.2d at 1128.
78 Id. at 1128-29.
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more protection than assault by a stranger?9 Then the court looked at case law
for definitions of cohabitation and decided that the essential elements were
found in the relationship, and the intimacy of the relationship, not in sharing
the same address.BO In this case, the court went beyond the statute to define the
scope of the relationship of those protected by the statute, using a combination
of legislative intent to protect victims of domestic violence, studies identifying
the victims of domestic violence, and case law defining cohabitation.
In State ex rel. Toledo Edison v. City of Clyde, at issue was whether the Miller
Act required the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio to review abandonment
or closing of the Toledo Edison electric facility in Clyde, and whether the Miller
Act protected Toledo facilities to the extent that Clyde could not serve future
new customers with its own electric utility after Toledo's franchise expired.Bl
The court began by stating it would review the history of the Miller Act, passed
in 1919, which it found "susceptible of more than one interpretation."82 It
reviewed preenactment wording changes, considered policy implications,
considered industry meaning of certain key terms, and cited a LSC bill analysis
of the 1978 Certified Territory Act and the language of a section of that Act,
together with related case law, to support its holding that Clyde could control
operation of utilities within its boundaries after the franchise expired.83
In In reAnnexation of 311.8434 Acres of Land v. Lewis the issue was whether
township trustees could appeal the approval of a landowner's petition for
annexation.B4 This case involved an alleged conflict between statutory
remedies provided in two different statutes. The court ultimately relied on an
LSC bill analysis which explained that the amendment to section 505.62 was
"only a response to this court's prior determination that township trustees
lacked standing in an appeal from the denial of a petition for annexation. The
amendment ... did not change the procedure for challenging the allowance of
a landowner's petition for annexation."85 Here the court looked at bill analyses
for different bills to sort out the intent of the legislature, and reversed the court
of appeal's holding that the statutes allowed concurrent remedies.
In State v. Economo, at issue was what quality of other evidence was necessary
to satisfy the corroboration requirement of the sexual imposition statute, which

79 Id. at 1129.
80Jd. at 1130.

81State ex rei. Toledo Edison Co. v. City of Clyde, 668 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio 1996).
82Jd. at 504.

83See id. at 506.
84Jn reAnnexation of 311.8434 Acres of Land v. Lewis, 597 N.E.2d 460 (Ohio 1992).

85See id. at 462 (quoting from LSC Bill Analysis of amendment to OHIO REv. CoDE
§ 505.62 which reported the Ohio Supreme Court ruling in In re Appeal of Bass Lake
Community, 449 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio 1983), that boards of township trustees lacked
standing in an appeal of a denial of an annexation petition .... The bill should confirm
standing.... ) (omissions added).
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only required that "no person shall be convicted of a violation of this section
solely upon the victim's testimony unsupported by other evidence."86 The
court ignored the justification provided for the corroboration rule in the LSC
analysis, which stated the rule was justified because of the ease with which this
crime may be abused in prosecution, and instead decided to leave to trial courts
the responsibility of ensuring that convictions for sexual imposition are based
on sufficient evidence.87 The prosecution had used the bill analysis as part of
its argument to abolish the corroboration requirement as unwise intent on the
part of the legislature, and the defendant had used the same analysis to support
its case for the requirement of more evidence. The court did not abolish the
requirement as requested by the prosecution, but did not require more evidence
as requested by the defendant. It used the LSC analysis as grist for its attack on
the legislature's differential treatment of the victims of this type of crime.88
Implicit in this attack on the legislature was an assumption that the bill analysis
reflected the legislative intent to keep the corroboration requirement.89
C. Use of LSC Bill Analyses to Understand the Purpose of the Legislation

In Zalud Oldsmobile Pontiac, Inc. v. Tracy, an appeal from the Board of Tax
Appeals, one issue was whether a section of the Ohio tax code violated the
federal Equal Protection Clause by treating taxpayers differently without a
rational basis.90 The court held that the General Assembly intended to adjust
certain depreciation expenses in response to federal tax changes in order to
maintain constant tax revenues and return windfalls to the taxpayer. The court
began its analysis of the statute with the LSC bill analysis of an earlier bill,
which explained the interaction of the Federal Economic Recovery Act of 1981
with Ohio tax law and the intent of the Ohio bill to change computation of
corporate net income in specific years only, and also cited The Journal of State
Taxation, before it arrived at its conclusion that the legislature had a legitimate
purpose to keep revenues level and a rational basis to sustain that purpose.91
In State v. Lovejoy, the issue was "whether the doctrines of double jeopardy
and collateral estoppel apply when a jury finds a defendant not guilty as to
some counts and is hung as to other counts."92 The court held that the doctrines
did not apply when the inconsistency arose out of responses to different counts.

86State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225, 227 (1996) (quoting OHIO REv. CODE
§ 2907.06(8)).
87Jd. at 230.

88The court adopted Judge Nugent's dissent to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga
County decision. See State v. Economo, No. 66408, 1994 WL 693485, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
8th Dist. Dec. 8, 1994).
89See Economo, 666 N.E.2d at 229.

90zalud Oldsmobile Pontiac, Inc. v. Tracy, 671 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio 1996).

91See id.
92State v. Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (Ohio 1997).
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The dissent argued that the doctrine of double jeopardy did apply, because the
separate offenses shared common issues. The dissent relied primarily on case
law, but also cited a LSC bill analysis of the robbery statute that stated "the
offense can be a lesser included offense to both forms of aggravated murder"
as part of its argument that both counts involved the same victim, conduct, and
proof.93
In State v. Smith, a death penalty appeal, the court rejected the defendant's
double jeopardy argument in favor of a single prison sentence for two counts
of aggravated robbery.94 The court stated that injury as an element of
aggravated robbery was inflicted on separate victims, and thus the offenses
were separate. The reasoning was supported by a LSC analysis of the
aggravated robbery statute. The Comment section of the bill analysis stated
that "[A] thief who ... steals different property from three separate victims ...
can be charged with and convicted of all three thefts."95
State v. Awkal was another death penalty appeai.96 The defendant argued
that the shooting was spur of the moment and thus an impulse murder, raising
the issue of whether length of time pondering the crime determined whether
he acted with prior calculation and design.97 The court cited a LSC bill analysis
from State v. D'Ambrosio.9B The LSC Comment defined prior calculation and
design to require "a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to
kill. ... neither the degree of care nor the length of time the offender takes to
ponder the crime beforehand are critical factors in themselves ... momentary
deliberation is insufficient."99 The court supported its decision that there was
sufficient evidence the accused acted with prior calculation with the bill
analysis explaining the statute.lOO
As these cases strongly suggest, Ohio courts generally have not used
legislative history to override the plain meaning of the text. Section 1.49 of the
Ohio Revised Code permits courts to rely on extrinsic sources only to resolve
ambiguities in the text. Eaton remains good law because LSC analyses, or any
extrinsic source, may not be used to override the plain meaning of text. The

93See id. at 1125.
94State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio 1997).
95 See id. at 694.
96State v. Awkal, 667 N.E.2d 960 (Ohio 1996).

97 Id. at 967.
98State v. D'Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 918 (Ohio 1993) (quoting State v. Cotton, 381
N.E.2d 190, 193 (1978)).
.

99Jd.
100See Citizens Ins. Co. of New Jersey v. Burkes, 381 N.E.2d at 967 (citing the LSC
Comment to OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2903.01). See also D'Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d at 918,
for another instance where the court used this LSC comment to define the requirements
of a "scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill." Id.
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danger is in reading Eaton as forbidding the use of LSC analysis to aid in any
statutory interpretation.lOl
The record described by Gold demonstrates that there is and has been some
type of legislative history maintained in Ohio and relied on by courts in Ohio
since the mid-19th century. Even though many commentators assume that
legislative history does not exist in Ohio, the Ohio Revised Code tells the courts
they may rely on legislative history when construing an ambiguous statute.
Based on the Ohio Revised Code, I conclude that legislative history in fact exists
in Ohio and that Ohio courts have been using a particular type of source over
the past seventeen years and calling it legislative history. I intend to explore
possible reasons for these contradictions later, after describing Ohio's
legislative process and particularly the Ohio Legislative Service Commission,
the source of the documents relied upon by Ohio courts.102
IV. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION

The Legislative Service Commission is a state agency created by statute in
1953 to provide technical and research services to the members of the General
Assembly.103 It is part of the legislative branch of Ohio government. "LSC staff
are non-partisan researchers and bill drafters who play a supporting role in the
legislative process" and are maintained "solely to give members of the General
Assembly access to the technical assistance and research capabilities that will
enable them to perform their duties efficiently and effectively."104
The "Commission" itself is composed of fifteen members: seven legislators
from the House, seven from the Senate, and a non-legislator Director of LSC
staff who is employed by the legislator members. The members include the
President of the Senate and six additional senators appointed by the President,
the Speaker of the House, and six additional representatives appointed by the
Speaker. In order to assure minority party representation, the statute provides
that no more than four of the six appointed members of each house may come
from the same party.105 The Commission maintains the staff "solely to give
members of. the General Assembly access to the technical assistance and

101Butsee850.Jur.3d, Statutes§§ 188,216 (1988&Supp. 1997), foranexampleofwhat
I believe is a misuse of both Eaton and Dickinson; Meeks is entirely absent from Section

188 on legislative history and Section 216 on the use of reports of committees or
commissions.
102The use of the House and Senate Journals is outside the scope of this paper; I am
focusing instead on the court's use of LSC documents as legislative history.
103See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 86; see also OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§§ 103.11-13
(Anderson 1990) for creation of LSC, its powers and duties.
104Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director, to Members of the Ohio General
Assembly and LSC Staff, on the role of LSC Staff (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter
Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director] (on file at LSC, to be incorporated into
Staff Manual).
105GuiDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 86-87.
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research capabilities that will enable them to perform their duties efficiently
and effectively."106 LSC staff work with and complement House and Senate
caucus staff)07
A. History of LSC

LSC was established in 1953 as part of a consolidation of governmental
research services under one single agency)OS The Commission of Code
Revision, formed in 1945 to codify and revise state law, recommended in its
final report that a permanent non-political research authority be established to
conduct research to draft legislative proposals during the interim between
sessions.l09 The Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB), formed earlier, retained
its responsibilities for bill and resolution drafting. LSC's primary duties
included legislative study committees and long term research reports,llO
short-term research on any subject, codification of the law of the state, and
impartial information and reports.111
In 1965, LSC began to accept individual member requests for bill drafts,
install computerized bill typing systems, and emphasize session-related
services. It also began, upon request, to provide staff for standing committees
of the House and Senate in the next session.112
The 1966 elections, the first under the one-person one-vote single-member
district system, brought in a large number of freshman legislators)13
Thereafter, the General Assembly, acting through the legislative leadership of

106See Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director, supra note 104.
107See id. See also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 84 (describing partisan personal and
caucus staff services; the House and Senate each have a majority and minority party
caucus).
108See DAVID A. JOHNS1DN, THE 0IDO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION-A
NoN-PoLmCAL PoLmCAL INSTITUTION 2 (1986) (reporting that The Ohio Program
Commission, the Legislative Research Commission and the Bureau [sic] of Code
Revision were merged into LSC) (on file with LSC).

109 See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF CODE REVISION 22 (House Journal, July 1,
1953).

110See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 87-88. Legislative study committees are a type of
long-term research approved by the Commission and undertaken by a special
committee of legislators. Other long-term research is done by LSC staff members either
after approval by the Commission, or upon requirement by specific legislation.

111See JOHNS1DN, supra note 108, at 2.
112See id. at 14-15 Oohnston was not specific as to who asked the Commission to
provide staff for committees, but all LSC staff work is in response to the General
Assembly acting through the Commission).

113 See Thomas A. Flinn, The Ohio General Assembly: A Developmental Analysis, in STATE
LEGISLATIVE INNOVATION 233 Games A. Robinson ed., 1973) and Samuel C. Patterson,
Legislative Politics in Ohio, in Omo POLmcs 238 (Alexander P. Lamis ed., 1994).
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the Commission, asked LSC staff to be present at every committee meeting.114
In 1967, the General Assembly moved toward an annual session approach.
Annual sessions changed the focus of LSC staff. With no interim, in-depth
interim studies faded away as demands for immediate staff work became more
frequent.llS
Staff size had increased in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s because
committee chairpersons "did not want staff assigned to their committees
doubling up on some other committee."116 Committees increased in number
as well, from 24 in 1967, to 38 in 1985. Staff at LSC increased from 34 in 1966
(including 20 professionals plus clerical staff) to 121 in 1985; LSC began with a
staff of 7 in 1953.117 LSC employs a staff of over 100 today, including about 60
professionals with either law or other advanced degrees.
In 1981, during a low point in state finances, the General Assembly abolished
the Legislative Reference Bureau. The legislature gave LSC the bill and
resolution drafting duties formerly assigned to the bureau. In doing so, it saved
money by eliminating the salary of the LRB director and one attomey.118 Prior
to its elimination in 1981, the LRB had primary responsibility for bill drafting,
while LSC had primary responsibility for long-term studies, and did some bill
drafting. In addition, LSC would prepare, upon legislator request,
implementing legislation that resulted from its own studies, and legislation for
special sessions.119 In 1965, the Commission decided to accept individual
member requests without taking formal action. "That session, LSC staff drafted
about 800 bills. Meanwhile, the LRB was drafting 1300 bills."120
In 1967 LSC placed into operation a computerized version of the code and
bill preparation system, which increased the capacity to produce bills tenfold
from 400 in 1963, to 4100 in a single session. David Johnston, primary chronicler
of LSC history, does not believe the computerized bill typing was the only
explanation for LSC's vast increase in the number of bills produced. He believes
the continued presence and support of LSC staff in committees was another
factor.121 According to Johnston, "members stopped drafting their own bills;
many lobbyists and state agency officials asked for bills as concepts rather than
handing legislators completely drafted bills to introduce; and legislators who

114See JoHNSTON, supra
115See id.

note 108.

at 15.

l16Jd. at 15-16.
117Jd.
118[d.

at 18. Frugality will emerge often as a prominent value in Ohio.

119JoHNSTON, supra note 108, at 31.
120 ld. at 34.
121Jd. at 35. "Computerized bill typing permitted a great increase in substitute bills
but the increases cannot be explained through that one factor. Indeed in the most recent
sessions when the total number of substitute bills went up, Commission drafting loads
went down." ld.
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received drafted bills from agencies and interest groups for introduction asked
LSC to go over them and redraft them as needed. These developments were
furthered by House and Senate rules that required all bills introduced to be
approved by the LSC or the LRB for form."122
The elimination of LRB meant that all bill drafting was done by LSC, by
drafters who sat in on and worked for the committees that heard the bills they
drafted, allowing them to hear the questions and concerns raised concerning
these bills.123 This is still the practice today.124

B. Bill Analyses
From its earliest days, members asked LSC to analyze certain bills and
explain their content because of the "combinations of complex language,
specialized word usage, and the broader legal context of bills ...."125 The
practice evolved gradually. First, the Senate President pro tern during the
mid-1950s asked for analyses of the bills considered by the Senate Rules
Committee. The analysis would explain how the bill changed the law, the
purpose of the bill, and how the bill would deal with the problem. Then all
Rules Committee members requested bill analyses.126
In 1961, senators asked LSC to provide the analyses requested by the Rules
Committee to all the senators before a vote on a bill in any floor session.127 By
1961, staff was providing bill analyses upon request, but not routinely, for the
House as well as the Senate; legislator feedback confirmed the value of this
service.128
LSC began to provide analyses to the House on a routine basis in 1967, rather
than just by request, in response to a 1966 study of legislative services, where
more than half of the House members indicated they wanted bill analyses.
When staff were provided for each standing committee, chairs were given the
option of having analyses done for their committees; all but House Judiciary
wanted them. Since the beginning of the 1967 session, LSC has prepared bill
analyses for both committee and floor use in both houses)29

122Jd. at 35-36.
123 Id. at 37.
124See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 86-92.
125JoHNSTON, supra note 108, at 41.
at 42.
127Jd. at 43.
126Jd.

128See Minutes from the Ohio Legislative Service Commission (February 27, 1961)
(recording a report by the Director that "the staff was doing bill analyses for the House
as well as the Senate this Session" and that "it was the consensus that this is one of the
most valuable services the staff can render during legislative sessions.") (on file with
LSC).

129JoHNSTON, supra note 108, at 43.
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C. LSC Staf!Today
Ohio's original approach to legislative staffing was different from other
states, and it still is. More typical is division by function with separate agencies
dedicated to drafting, code revision, research, library, and fiscal review.130 LSC
is a centralized staff agency; each professional staff member performs research,
bill drafting, bill analysis, and committee staffing. Organization is by subject
matter groups based on the committee structure of the legislature.131
The members of the General Assembly in Ohio have their own small partisan
staff.132 Ohio employs a smaller total partisan and non-partisan legislative staff
when compared to nearby states that have comparable population and also
have full-time legislatures.133
At least one LSC staff person is assigned to each standing committee and
subcommittee of the House and Senate.134 That person attends all committee
meetings, so he or she is able to listen to testimony and debate, and become
acquainted with the members of the committee. Bill drafting is done in this
context of an ongoing relationship.l35 When a legislator wants to draft
legislation, he discusses his ideas with LSC staff or gives drafts to LSC to review,
and the LSC staff works with the legislator to put the ideas into language.136

130Telephone Interview with Brian Weberg, Principal Staff Associate in the
Legislative Management Program, National Conference of State Legislatures Ouly 28,
1997).
131 JOHNSTON, supra note 108, at 47-48.
132See Patterson, Legislative Politics in Ohio, supra note 113, at 255. "For a legislature in
an urban, industrial state, the Ohio House and Senate operate with relatively lean staffs."
Id. See also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 84-86 (listing the caucus and personal staff
available). "Caucus and personal staff include caucus aides, legislative aides,
administrative aides, secretaries, legislative interns, and pages." Id. Both chambers have
a minority and majority party caucus. "The majority party in each house normally
controls how funds appropriated for the operation of the particular house are allocated
... including the number of staff available to members." Id. See, e.g., the telephone listing
of the House staff for the 122nd General Assembly. Each Republican representative has
an administrative assistant and a legislative assistant. Each Democrat has one assistant
listed. The Senate's telephone listing lists almost twice as many Republican aides
(twenty-nine) as Democratic aides (sixteen).
133Telephone interview with Brian Weberg, supra note 130. Pennsylvania and New
York, for example, have central agencies, but they are more removed from the legislative
process; total staff in New York is 5000 and in Pennsylvania 2700. Most of these are
partisan staff. Ohio, in contrast, is considered to be a large state with a full time
legislature that "reins in size of staff," according to Weberg. Staff size in Ohio is under
500. Id.

134See GUIDEBOOK supra note 35, at 87.
135See id. at 90-92.
136See id. at 46, section titled "From Idea to Bill."
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LSC staff do not make or advocate policy; they listen to the members and
help them put their policy intention into words.137 The members also listen to
lobbyists and to their party caucus.138 LSC staff are answerable only to the
members, not to the lobbyists, when drafting a bill, unless and only if instructed
by the member to work with the lobbyist.139 The LSC staff are agents of the
institution, the General Assembly, because they serve at the pleasure of the
General Assembly.140 However, when drafting a bill, they act as the agent of
the individual member. Their role depends upon their ability to be trusted as
neutral and non-partisan. "Non-partisan" in Ohio means researching and
teaching, providing information, and laying out options, rather than
advocating one position over another. It means putting political intentions into
technical language, because technical revisions do not involve taking sides.l41
The members can tum to lobbyists or members of their party for political
instruction, but they tum to LSC for technical assistance in research, drafting,
factual interpretation of the meaning of words, how a bill fits into current law
and how it will change current law.142 Thus, the legislators use different sources
for technical and for political information. The assistance of non-partisan staff
does not deprive legislators of political staff or make the legislative process
non-political; instead, it makes the acquisition of facts non-political.143

137See id.
138See Patterson, Legislative Politics in Ohio, supra note 113, at 24, "party caucuses are
the routine site for discussing and hashing out party stands, for the exchange of
information between leaders and backbenchers .... ,"and at 256 n.28 (citing Barbara
Bolt Lewis, Ohio Lobbying 1992 (Ph.D. dissertation Ohio State University), "lobbying
by interest groups is very much in evidence in the capital," but the leadership" constrains
and channels interest group influence."
139See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 90-92 (describing lobbyist drafting as an
occasional, not regular, occurrence).
140See Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director, supra note 104.
14lfor a discussion of non-partisan staff in Congress, as well as a comparison of
partisan and non-partisan staff in general, see MICHAEL MALBIN, UNELECTED
REPRESENTATIVES 170, 172, 177, 184, 186 (1980) (describing the non-partisan staff who
served the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation from 1964-1976 and 1977-78).
Id. at 187-201, (describing a different kind of "non-partisan staff that has policy
preferences, operates from certain assumptions and makes policy recommendations
based on those assumptions"); see id. at 202, (explaining that when staff use debatable
assumptions to make judgments that have policy implications, it is more difficult to
maintain a non-partisan posture). LSC staff avoid policy recommendations. See
Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director, supra note 104.
142Interview with Bill Heaphy, Research Attorney, LSC, in Columbus, Ohio Ouly 17,
1997).

143See MALBIN, supra note 141, at 242-43 (commenting on the advantages of dual staff).
"If every committee [in Congress] had a nonpartisan professional staff core, there would
be fewer occasions on which Congress would receive intentionally partial or distorted
information from its staff ... Let every committee have a dual staff.... "); see also
JOHNSTON, supra note 108, at 8, 64 where he attributes the acceptance of LSC to both the
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Once a bill is drafted, and before the first committee hearing, the LSC staff
person writes a bill analysis, which is distributed to committee members while
the bill is in committee, updated to reflect amendments made while in
committee, and distributed to everyone else when it leaves committee to be
voted on in the House or Senate. When the bill moves to the second chamber,
another LSC staff person, assigned to the committee in that chamber, reads the
bill and writes another bill analysis, which may be different. The staffer in the
second chamber will always give the bill a fresh look even if there are no
changes, and at minimum write a new bill analysis with new title and history.
The staffer in the second chamber is usually responsible for the final bill
analysis after a bill is enacted, so the person who writes that final analysis is
not the same person who helped draft the bill. Occasionally, with long complex
bills, the analysis is a cooperative effort by more than one staff member.l44 The
bill analysis will focus solely on the text as it is and what that text means, how
it affects existing law, and what the repercussions of that particular text will
be.l45 It is usually more than a mere restatement of what the bill says.146
The process of preparing bill analyses is less interactive than actual bill
drafting. When bills are drafted, regular dialogue occurs between the sponsor
and LSC. It is the sponsor who has the final word about what the bill as
introduced will say. Political considerations will be a factor. The LSC staffer is
there to help implement those choices in drafting, but the legislator is the
lawmaker. By contrast, LSC staff preparing bill analyses work on their own
with review by their division chiefs. If it is obvious that what the text says is
not what the sponsor intended, the staffer will call the sponsor to tell him or
her about the problem and what the bill analysis will say. The bill analysis of
that version does not change, however. The function of the bill analysis is to
tell the member what the text as written at that point will do, not what the
member wants the bill to do, something that has already been discussed
between LSC and the legislator. For various reasons, language planned by the

service it provides and its coexistence with partisan caucus staff.
144When the bill moves to the second chamber, usually another LSC staff person
writes an analysis, and each staff person's work is reviewed by a division chief and later
by the Director. Telephone Interview with Dennis Papp, LSC Research Attorney (March
4, 1998).

145See LSC STAFF MANUAL, Bill Analysis, 8 (warning of the pitfalls of believing a bill
"does or does only what its stated intent is." Instructing that sometimes a bill does not
do what it is intended to do; or "it does what it is intended and has other significant
implications.'")
146See id. at 4-5 (for instructions about how to write a bill analysis). A bill analysis
should not be just a "bland regurgitation of the bill's contents ... "or "merely recite the
things the bill does in the order in which the bill does them." The bill analysis
"[f]requently ... must go beyond the language of the bill to an explanation of present
law or a discussion of a given situation in order to provide adequate understanding of
what a bill does or attempts to do." Id. But see MELANIE K. PU1NAM & SusAN M.
SCHAEFGEN, OHIO LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 96 (1997). "The purpose of the bill analyses is
to summarize the bill for the legislator."
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legislator can result in unintended consequences, and the point of the analysis
is to help the legislator ultimately end up with text that is likely to accomplish
his purpose. Thus, if there is a problem with the bill, the legislator and LSC staff
may write an amended version. Different bill analyses for each version
highlight and analyze the effect of even small changes in the text, and also
highlight the intent to make those changes.147
Because a new bill analysis is written for each version of a bill, members can
compare versions for changes and for the implications of the changes.l48 A
different type of bill analysis, called the synopsis, is particularly useful for
comparing the effects of substitute bills, amendments, and conference
committee recommendations.l49 Legislators rely on their partisan and
non-partisan sources in different ways: they rely on the LSC bill analysis to
understand the content of a bill, and on their party caucus for their political
and policy decision-making)SO
There is empirical support for the proposition that both legislators and staff
read and rely upon bill analyses)Sl A recent Document Survey conducted by
LSC of legislators and staff asked how often bill analyses were used to 1) learn
the details of a bill; 2) obtain an overview of a bill; 3) learn how a bill affects
existing law; 4) find the location of a specific provision in a bill; and, 5) find out
if a bill has potential problems. Of 144 responding, 135 replied that they
frequently used bill analyses to get an overview of a bill; 119 replied that they
frequently used bill analyses to learn the details of the bill; 72 replied that they
frequently used bill analyses to learn how a bill affects existing law; and 43
replied that they frequently used bill analyses to find out if a bill has potential
problems.l52 Individual comments from legislators included, "I am extremely

147Interview with Dennis Papp, LSC Research Attorney, in Columbus, Ohio
(September 18, 1997); interview with Shelagh Baker, LSC Division Chief, in Columbus,
Ohio (September 11, 1997).
148Telephone interview with Dennis Papp, supra note 144.
149Interview with Bill Heaphy, supra note 142, (relating that, in his experience,
legislators use comparative synopsis to make sure something has not been "slipped in.")
Synopses are required by House Rules 36 and 63.

l50See id.
l5lSee LSC STAFF MANUAL, supra note 145, at 13 (emphasizing the continuing
importance of bill analysis for legislators, and thus the importance of LSC staff effort in
this area.)
l52See Report to the Director, Document Review Committee Survey of Legislators and
Staff (Oct. 1996) (on file at LSC). The committee mailed surveys to 340 legislators and
staff, including aides, caucus staff, and administrative assistants of House members who
did not have legislative aides. They received responses from 27 Representatives, 6
Senators, 65 House staffers, and 46 Senate staffers, for a total of 144 responses.
Respondents were given three choices of response: frequently, sometimes, and rarely.
The committee was established to "review and critique the major documents the LSC
staff prepares for the General Assembly" and questioned members and their staff to
determine usefulness of and solicit suggestions for the improvement of bill analyses,
comparative synopses, the digest of enactments, and other documents. Id. I am limiting
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dependent upon them;" "It is always helpful to have a section boiled down,
[sic] essential thrust of the main operation of the bill."153 Individual comments
from staff included, "All analysis [sic] are helpful because it is much more
difficult to read the actual bill;" "There is hardly a day that goes by that I do not
use a bill analysis for one reason or another. Sometimes it is for bringing myself
up to speed on an issue or for giving a constituent an easy-to-understand
version;" "Only when an analysis has not yet been drafted do I begin the tedious
job of reading the entire bill and preparing my own synopsis for a clearer
understanding." 154
The record provided by the history of LSC, the minutes of a 1961
Commission meeting, the requests for more of this type of service over the
passage of time, and the results of the most recent survey all indicate that bill
analyses are a valuable resource for legislators. Given that legislators and their
personal aides read bill analyses for both an overview and the details of a bill,
the bill analysis appears to be something on which the legislators rely upon
before they vote. That reliance comes close to representing something about
the shared intent of the legislature, which is a key factor in legislative history
reliability for courts according to commentators who write about federal
legislative history.155 If the majority of legislators do read bill analyses before
voting, then that practice gives insights into what assumptions were made by
legislators about how their words would be understood and the setting in

my discussion to the results of questions about bill analyses. According to the chairman
of the Document Review Committee, everyone who responded to the questionnaire
filled out the multiple choice portion. The responses to the multiple choice questions
followed a strong pattern. The committee did not break down the results to distinguish
between staff and legislator response. Not all respondents provided individual
comments, though, so the committee found the breakdown of comments between
members and staff to be more interesting and useful. Telephone interview with Jim
Kelly, LSC Research Associate Oune 3, 1998).

153See generally Report to the Director, supra note 152 (These comments from
legislators and from staff were in response to LSC requests for suggestions for
improvement); see also LSC Staff Memo, Document Review Committee Adopted
Recommendations, January 8, 1997, ("dramatic fundamental changes to LSC documents
were not warranted but the documents could be made more useful to legislators and
their staff.... All in all, the revisions are changes in packaging, rather than content.")
154Report to the Director, supra note 152.

155See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of
Statutes; Idle Chatter or Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 74-75 (1994)( describing how
members of Congress examine and rely upon a committee report for information about
a bill's content and its expected consequences before they vote, because the committee
has been given responsibility for drafting the text and explaining its meaning, ... "not
because each member has agreed to it in the way a member 'agrees to' text through a
vote."; see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. CALL. REv. 845,863-65 (1991)(defending the idea that a group purpose or intent
can be ascribed to group action by giving common-sense examples from everyday life
where society does ascribe a group intent, despite the possibility of slightly varying
motives for each individual in the group making the decision).
·
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which they made these assumptions.156 I will not indulge in philosophical
debate as to whether collective intent exists; I am assuming for the purposes of
this paper that it exists and can be found. One practical reason to do so is that
the Ohio Revised Code allows courts to look for legislative intent when the
language of a statute is ambiguous.157
V. A COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND OHIO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. What is Legislative History?

Even those involved in Ohio legislative process might say that Ohio has no
legislative history, because they define legislative history as what Congress
creates, i.e., a verbatim record carefully indexed and kept in volumes in law
libraries everywhere. Many observers seem to think that if a state keeps a record
similar to that of Congress, it has legislative history, and if it does not, it simply
has no legislative history. I want to sift through the actual ingredients of
legislative history at the federal level; look at precisely which ingredients courts
rely upon and why; then look again at Ohio legislative history and compare.
At its simplest, legislative history is the circumstances of the creation of the
statute)SS A more narrow definition is the institutional progress of a bill to
enactment. At its most detailed, it is a complete record of every word of debate
and testimony ever spoken or written about a bill.l59
Courts value legislative history for the insight it provides about the intent of
the legislators, or the mischief at which the text is aimed)60 This is particularly
so when the language of the statute is ambiguous or incomplete, although
courts also use legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of the text.161
Congress produces a vast quantity of legislative history, but not all of it is con-

l56See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing how legislative history
can also help those who prefer the "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation.
Judge Easterbrook distinguishes different uses of legislative history and comments that
"[t]o decode words one must frequently reconstruct the legal and political culture of the
drafters. Legislative history rna y be invaluable in revealing the setting of the enactment
and the assumptions its authors entertained about how their words would be
understood.").
l57See

OHIO REv. CODE ANN., supra note 26, § 1.49.

158WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, ]R. & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 733 (1995).
159See Orro HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 438 (2d ed. 1993) (cited in
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 158, at 733 n.l (providing a checklist of all the materials
that will constitute the legislative history of a law; number 11 of the list is analysis of
bill by legislative counsel).
160See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 51, at 356 (The most authoritative historical
evidence is the legislative history of the statute, because it is a contemporary record
made by the enacting legislators).
161See

Brudney, supra note 155, at 42-43 & n.l72.
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sidered equally reliable for this purpose.162 There are problems of
manipulation, and there is skepticism that collective intent can ever be
determined.163 When federal courts do rely on legislative history, their first
choice for an authoritative source is usually the committee report. Committee
reports are accessible, describe the problems the proposed legislation is meant
to resolve and the solutions offered by the bill, and contain a "section by section
summary of the provisions of the bill."164
Another reason courts use committee reports as legislative history is because
the committee report is relied upon by those not on the committee to tell them
what the purpose of the bill is and what the bill will accomplish. The other
members will trust the committee report's contents because they trust its
authors.l65 When a court is interpreting a federal statute it is trying to
determine what Congress intended, and if the text does not provide the answer,
it seeks evidence of what Congress intended in a document relied upon by
those who voted on the bill. The committee report is the relied-upon
document.166 Thus it is considered to be the most reliable form of legislative
history, because it represents a shared understanding reached by Congress as
a body.167
There are many other forms of federal legislative history: floor debates,
hearings, statements by sponsors or drafters, post-enactment legislative
history, and legislative inaction.l68 But reliability diminishes as possibilities for
manipulation increase. Further, some federal judges do not consider any
legislative history reliable because they do not believe in the concept of
"collective intent" and are concerned about manipulation of records of
history.l69

162See id. at 47-48, 56, 75-76. Legislative history is not voted upon, much of it is
produced by staff who are not elected, and members may at times insert statements in
the record for the purpose of swaying a court. This does not means that legislative
history should be disregarded, but it does suggest that reliability of types of history in
general, and "key elements" of particular pieces of any history, need to be evaluated.
163See id. at 5. See also Breyer, supra note 155, at 863-66 for a defense of belief in group
intent as a reasonable concept.
164See EsKRJrx;E & FRICKEY, supra note 158, at 743. The authors recognize that in state
legislatures, committee reports take on different forms, one of which is a staff analysis
of a pending bill. Id. at 744.
165See Brudney, supra note 155, at 74-75 & n.298.
166See id.
167See id. at 27-29 (describing how members of Congress use committee reports);
("reliability attaches mainly because the history is a product of legislative mechanisms
that the generality of members of embraced"). Id. at 70.
168See generally EsKRirx;E &

FRICKEY,

supra note 158, at 733-832.

169 Id. at 749. See also Brudney, supra note 155, at 48-49.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

27

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

76

[Vol. 46:49

Actual committee minutes or reports in Ohio are not uniform in content,
style, production, or use.l70 Bill analyses are fairly uniform, however, and I
have shown that members of the Ohio General Assembly rely on bill analyses
for an accurate neutral explanation of what the bill will accomplish.l71 If a
committee report is the single most important item of federal legislative history,
then it is interesting to compare its elements with the elements of the LSC bill
analysis.172
A committee report may contain "a description of the bill's purpose and
scope, a statement of the reasons it should be enacted, a section-by-section
analysis, a report on changes the bill would make in existing law, committee
amendments, communications for the executive branch, if any, minority
reports if any, and various other items."173
An LSC bill analysis will describe the historical, social or legal background
that gave rise to the bill, the scope of the changes it will make in existing law
and the likely effect of those changes, and contain a section by section analysis.
The bill analysis will not take an advocacy position as to why the bill should
be enacted.174 It will instead describe the effect of the bill and reasons for
enacting the bill. If the text as drafted does not accomplish the specific detailed
purpose the sponsor had in mind, the analysis by its very nature will inform
the sponsor, and the sponsor can amend the bill so that it is more likely to

170See PUTNAM & ScHAEFGEN, supra note 146, at 91. "Unlike federal legislative history,
hearings, testimony, debate and committee reports are not typically available ...." Id.
See also Interview with Debbie Tavenner, supra note 38 (reporting that records of
testimony are randomly, rather than consistently, available).
171See Report to the Director, supra note 152.

172The context of the bill drafting process in Ohio is text-centered, as I have described
in part IV-C, LSC Staff Today, infra. Thus, legislative history is not expected to fill in
gaps or answer questions left unanswered because of careless drafting. The differences
in the content and quantity of legislative history in Ohio and Washington exist because
of the differences in context-less legislative history is needed. Professional drafters are
employed in order to avoid as much as possible the problems caused by careless drafting
errors. Nevertheless, bill analyses contain remarkable similarities to committee reports.
What is missing from bill analysis, compared to committee reports, may not be needed
in Ohio. For example, elaborate purpose statements are not employed in Ohio on a
regular basis; purpose is to be inferred from the operative provisions. See LSC BILL
DRAFTING MANUAL IV-11 (1993 ). Executive agencies employ legislative liaisons to attend
committee, and agency rules come back to LSC for code revision before they are codified
into rules. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 103-06.
173See CHRISTINA L.

KUNZ ET.

AL., THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 282 (1992).

174See LSC STAFF MANUAL, supra note 145, at 1 (reminding staff that the General
Assembly wanted to make accurate and objective information available to members
through the bill analysis) and 13 (describing when section-by-section analyses are
useful, such as for longer bills, but cautioning that this technique alone will not provide
an explanation of the bill). See also Telephone Interview with Dennis Papp, LSC Research
Attorney (May 11, 1998) (distinguishing an analysis of all the sections of a bill from a
section-by-section analysis).
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accomplish the intended purpose.175 If the bill intends to change the law in
response to a judicial decision, the bill analysis will say so.l76
Each bill analysis for subsequent versions of a bill will describe changes in
the bill and the effects of those changes on the bill and on existing law. The
comparative synopsis, a format that compares amendments or substitute bills,
also highlights and compares the effect of each proposed change.177 A
comparison of the versions of bills and their analyses will provide insight into
what happened at each stage of the legislative process. The final bill analysis
of the enacted bill will explain the effect of any floor amendments added in the
second chamber or in conference committee.178
Thus, bill analyses contain many of the valuable ingredients found in federal
committee reports, such as information about the bill's purpose and scope, a
section-by-section analysis, the changes it will make in existing law, and
amendments to the bill as introduced. Moreover, bill analyses lack some of the
liabilities of federal legislative history. They are written by non-partisan
drafters, they are based on the text alone, and they are not subject to the
manipulation of political forces. Although a bill analysis will not describe a
purpose that is at odds with a poorly drafted text, it will accent and emphasize
the intent of text to change the law, or aid in construing intent of text that is
ambiguous despite careful drafting. There is less legislative history in Ohio, but
what there is, is "choice."179 Ohio courts during the past 18 years have
increasingly used these bill analyses, either to assure themselves that they have
understood the intent of the legislature when interpreting a new statute, or to
understand an ambiguous statute.lSO

175Typically, the purpose will have been established through a dialogue between
legislator and LSC staff prior to and during bill drafting.

176See,e.g., bill analysis forS.R. 98,122ndGen. Assembly(Ohio 1997), which explained
that the bill provided that a court could not dismiss criminal charges when the only
reason for dismissal was the request of the complaining witness and the prosecutor
objected to the dismissal (emphasis added). This was a change in the law in reaction to
the Ohio Supreme Court.
177See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 56.
17BSee id. at 57. The inclusion of floor amendments in the final analysis could be
compared, in legislative history value, to the record of colloquies in Congress.
179 As a point of comparison, I am inspired by Spencer Tracy's remarks in the movie
PAT AND MIKE (Metro Goldwyn-Mayer 1952) about Katherine Hepburn's slight figure
compared to her athletic ability. Mike said "she may not have much meat on her but
what she has is cherce (sic)." Id. Ohio does not have the quantity of legislative history
that Congress produces, but what Ohio does have is useful, reliable, and efficiently
produced. Mike admired Pat's figure, and I admire what Ohio has managed to do with
its leaner resources.

lBDSee infra Part III.
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Ultimately it is the legislature and the courts that decide what legislative
history is and which kind is reliable,l81 Ohio emphasizes textual accuracy in
its approach to drafting in a number of ways. Those who work for LSC believe
that with careful attention to detail and to the wishes of the legislator, accurate
text is achievable.182 Although LSC staff are not the only ones who draft,
because some legislators do their own drafting, the technical services staff will
still review their text for technical elements,l83 LSC staff provide bill analyses
for the legislators as a method of checking if the text accomplishes its purpose;
if it does not, amendments are likely to follow. These bill analyses are available
for the entire General Assembly and their staff to read.184 This approach may
actually work well enough that problems of interpretation do not come up as
frequently as they do with federal law. By contrast, drafting in Congress is more
fractured and corrections in process are difficult.185
But interpretive problems still do arise in Ohio, even if infrequently, and
section 1.49 of the Ohio Revised Code allows the courts to use extrinsic sources
in those instances. In Ohio, commentators and some lawyers have been slow
to notice this. In the next part, I will speculate about possible reasons. If
attorneys are not aware of what is available, is it because the evidence is hidden,
or is it because many attorneys are concrete thinkers and conceive of "legislative
history" as "federal legislative history" only?

B. Political Culture, Legislative Process, and Legislative History
Washington, D.C., and Columbus, Ohio, are culturally different. If these two
cities also have different political cultures with different political habits and
personality, style and values, the Ohio legislature and legislative process
should not be a carbon copy of Congress. The differences in political history,
habits and traditions, which reflect the values of the state's residents, have an
impact on the types of institutions a state adopts,l86

lBlCf, Shirley S. Abrahamson and Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for
Legislators and judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1045, 1049 (1991) (The
authors make an assumption that "state judges and state legislators appear to influence
each other in the common enterprise of interpreting, applying and improving statutes,"
before they analyze how judges interact with legislators through opinions, and how
legislators then communicate with courts). Id. at 1050.
182J base this observation on my interviews and interactions with LSC staff. This belief
seems implicit, as well, in the length and detail of the instructions in the LSC BILL
DRAFTING MANUAL, the procedures of the code revision staff, and the proofreading by
the bill preparation staff, as described in the GUIDEBOOK at pp. 91-92.

l83See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 91.
l84See supra Part IV, B.
l85See, e.g., EsKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 158, at 757-58.
186ALAN ROSENTifAL, LEGISLATIVE LIFE: PEOPLE, PROCESS AND PERFORMANCE IN TifE
STATES 111 (1981) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE LIFE]. "Legislatures are interwoven in the
fabric of their states; and the legislative process cannot be considered in isolation from
the prevailing ethos, the political ethics, and the capital community of the state in which
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"Political culture" describes "the political habits built up by a group of people
and transmitted from one generation to another;" it is the "personality
structure" of the state.187 This concept can be useful even though there is no
single standard about how to measure or classify the culture.188 The concept
of political culture "sensitizes us to the distinctive and persistent qualities of
each state-its styles of politics, the orientation of its citizens, and the
heterogeneity within the state itself." Each state is assumed to have a unique
political culture.l89
What exactly is different about political culture in Ohio? Ohio is
fundamentally conservative.190 It is a diverse state, geographically, ethnically,
and economically, but its diversity has complex effects and seems to lead to
resistance to change. Ohio voters are particularly conservative, as evidenced
by patterns of gubernatorial elections throughout Ohio history. The state's
history of choosing governors follows a pattern of electing candidates who
promise to trim the budget, alternating with periodic but short terms by
candidates who try to raise taxes and restore state services, who are then ousted
from office by another candidate promising to trim spending. Ohio remains
low in support for funding of state services.191
Ohio's policy choices are cautious because even though the political parties
are strong, they are nearly equal in numbers and power, so that state-wide
solutions must be a compromise between competing partisan groups. The large
number of cities in Ohio makes it difficult for one city to dominate the state;
without one dominant party or city or region, leaders must seek compromise

it operates." Id.
187Jd. at 112.
188DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 93-126 (2d ed.
1984), cited in LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 186, at 113-14, n.3. Elazar uses a formulation
to measure state political cultures. Elazar measures state culture on the basis of citizen
orientation as individualistic, moralistic and traditionalistic. Ohio has an individualistic
culture, which means that government's role is limited and politics is for the
professionals. See id.
189LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 186, at 112 (comparing the states in style, attitudes
towards political participation and the role of government, using Daniel Elazar's
formulation of state political cultures).
190JoHN H. FENTON, MIDWEST POLmCS 153 (1966), cited in ALAN ROSENTHAL, STAFFING
THE OHIO LEGISLATURE 2 (1972) and John J. Gargan & Alexander P. Lamis, Bibliographical
Essay, in OHIO PoLmcs380 (Alexander P. Lamis ed., 1994). Fenton described "persistent
conservative cultural patterns" in Ohio and was the first to describe Ohio politics as
"issueless." Fenton found "a legacy of potent historical events mixed with persistent
conservative cultural patterns reinforced by pervasive lack of information salient to the
working man or woman." Gargan & Lamis, supra. Rosenthal quoted Fenton, describing
Ohio, as dedicated to the "virtues of honesty, thrift, steadiness, and caution" and
observed that this dedication continues, which makes radical change to existing patterns
quite difficult. ROSENTHAL, supra.
191See generally George W. Knepper, Ohio Politics: A Historical Perspective, in OHIO
POLITICS, supra note 190, at 10-11, 15.
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solutions. Candidates seeking statewide office must water down ideology to
appeal to both ends of the political spectrum. Even though partisan
identification by legislators and voters is strong in Ohio, it tends to be issueless
and detached from consistent policy differences,l92 The compromises tend to
result in conservative choices. One choice that has been persistently popular in
Ohio history is cutting taxes.193 This leads those in elected office to believe that
economy and frugality is very important to voters.
How do these characteristics of political culture affect the Ohio legislative
process? An exhaustive list is beyond the scope of this paper, but staffing in
Ohio is a pertinent example ,194 Non-partisan staff is less costly to maintain than
partisan staff because, as common sense dictates, you don't need two of every
type of staff person, and therefore can function with a smaller legislative
staff,l95 Non-partisan staff produce a different type of report as legislative
history: neutral. If the neutral reports are accepted as accurate by both parties,
a smaller quantity of reports will be necessary.196 In addition, the Ohio

192See id. See also Patterson, supra note 113; ROSENTHAL, supra note 190.
193See generally Knepper, supra note 191.
194See, e.g., Alan P. Balutis, Legislative Staffing: A View from the States, in LEGISLATIVE
STAFFING: A CoMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 106 Games J. Heaphey & Alan P. Balutis eds.,
1975) ("[S]taffing as a factor in the process of legislation has been, until fairly recently,
almost completely ignored by political scientists ... to the extent that professional staff
has been a subject of study, the utility of this research for students of legislatures has
been limited by a major perceptual bias .... [l]egislative scholars have seemed to believe
that Congress, and Congress alone, is worthy of study."); ROSENTHAL, supra note 190, at
2 ("The development of professional staffing in Ohio must be rooted in this state's
experience and this legislature's structure"); Susan Webb Hammond, Legislative Staffs,
in THE HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (Gerhard Loewenberg, et al. eds., 1985)
(explaining the history, development and importance of research on legislative staffing
in general).
195See ROSENTHAL, supra note 190, at 2 (observing that the Ohio legislators he
interviewed "expressed a devotion to economy and a concern about wastefulness and
abuse. Legislators demand no more professional staff than is absolutely necessary to
help them accomplish their job." See also JOHNSTON, supra note 108, at 64 (observing that
Ohio has a "thrift ethic." "When a significant service can be provided at relatively low
cost its legislators will buy it. The alternative method of staffing with each house having
its own research, committee, and in some instances, bill drafting staffs, is inherently
inefficient.")
196Compare Balutis, supra note 194, at 13 (describing a hypotheses that different kinds
of staff have different effects, although the evidence is "sketchy and impresionistic," and
it is possible that different kinds of arrangements may affect the balance of powers in
the legislatures) and JOHNSTON, supra note 108, at 64-65 (suggesting that LSC works in
Ohio because "the members of the Commission are the legislative leaders. They control
it ... it makes them feel more at ease with having a non-partisan staff. The LSC does not
represent an alternate source of power nor will it try to be one .... and ... it keeps their
members satisfied. Without it leaders would face a variety of demands for staff services,
especially for committee staff but also for additional aides to individual members. The
present system is one in which a high degree of continuity is maintained and leaders
do not have to contend with committee chairmen over how much staff support they can
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legislature has not seen fit to transcribe its every word,197 perhaps because
legislative history costs money to store and preserve.l98
The rules for public record keeping in Ohio also reflect Ohio frugality. Public
record keeping in Ohio is governed by section 149.333 of the Ohio Revised
Code, which requires only that state agencies submit a plan for retention
and/ or destruction of records to a state records administrator for approval.199
Decisions about record keeping are ultimately made for LSC, like all other state
agencies, by a state records administrator and a state auditor.200 Fiscal
considerations play a role in their decision; an example of a fiscal consideration
is the expense of using available space for records. LSC is forced to make
record-keeping decisions based on the space made available to it by the state,
and the state auditor approves the plan.201 The General Assembly has not
legislated any different plan for LSC records. The state does not seem to want
to use inordinate amounts of space and money to retain records.
In contrast, there are a number of reasons why the use of partisan staff can
cause an increase in total number of staff. If one house has its own staff, the
other house will want its own staff, and the total staff size will double. If one
party has its own staff, the other party will also need complementary staff of
its own, and staff size will be doubled. Partisan staff inevitably means either
larger numbers of staff or resentment by the house or party without the
numbers. As staff size increases, staff members create a power structure of their
own and can even create distance between the legislators and constituents and
lobbyists. As staff size increases, eventually the work increases as well, for the

have and who their staff should be").
197House and Senate sessions have been videotaped by a small cable company since
the statehouse restoration. There is no plan yet for cataloging or transcribing the tapes.
Interview with Renee Jensen, Operations Manager of Ohio Government
Telecommunications, in Columbus, Ohio Ouly 29, 1997).
l98See generally, National Archives Running Out of Room, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Mar. 25, 1998, at A02, available in 1998 WL3762866 (describing how the National Archives
is running out of storage space, necessitating a new facility that may also run out of
space. The Archives head, John Carlin, is seeking $230 million for the fiscal year, an
increase of 12% over this year.
1990mo REv. CODE ANN. § 149.333 (Anderson 1990). "No state agency shall retain,
destroy, or otherwise transfer its state records in violation of this section ... Each state
agency shall submit to the state records administrator all applications for records
disposal or transfer and all schedules of records retention and destruction. The state
records administrator shall review such applications and schedules and provide written
approval, rejection, or modification of the application or schedule.... " The decision of
this administrator to approve or reject the plan will be "based upon the continuing
administrative and fiscal value of the state records to the state or to its citizens ... "
(emphasis added).

200Interview with Debbie Tavenner, supra note 38.
201Jd.
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legislator and the staff. Staff become entrepreneurial with agendas of its own,
seeking new innovative ideas that lead to more work for more staff.202
Partisan staff is a choice and is not necessarily inevitable; once the choice is
made, it is difficult to turn back. A perspective informed only by Congressional
experience might assume that either non-partisan staff is impossible or that
partisan staff is preferable because that is how things are done in Washington.
Even Washington once tried to maintain a non-partisan staff, and certain
committees continued to rely on non-partisan staff through the 1970s.203 Ohio
demonstrates that non-partisan and partisan staff can work together in the
legislative process because each meets different needs.204 States save money by
using non-partisan staff for information and technical support, and saving
money has historically been important to Ohio voters.
The partisan but issueless attitude that often characterizes Ohio legislators
may be another reason non-partisan staff is accepted here. Researchers have
found in both recent and in earlier studies of legislators an odd mix of strong
party identification without ideology or issue-orientation.205 Perhaps because
particular issues are not charged with party identity it is easier for Ohio
legislators to turn to neutral researchers for objective facts when drafting bills.
After the facts are available, the political decisions are made. The fact-finding
process itself may not be political because the issues are not perceived as
political.
There is a "Washington bias" in research and commentary on state
legislatures.206 Because each of the fifty states has a different political culture,
generalities about political process in "the states" are unwise. I have discussed
staffing differences; the states are different from each other in many other ways
which I will not explore in depth. For example, some have part-time "citizen"
legislatures who serve without pay and some have full-time "professional"
legislatures. The Ohio General Assembly is now considered full-time, but many
members have second full-time careers, so that even the word "full-time" does
not mean the same in every state.207 Also, a number of states have term limits,
including Ohio, while many others do not. With respect for the staff support
for these legislators, some states have one central agency, others have multiple

202See MALBIN, supra note 141, at 163-65, 248-49 (describing these occurrences in
Congress).
203Jd. (briefly describing non-partisan staff in Congress). See generally HARRISON W.
FOX, ]R. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS 22 (1977) (discussing the
history of the development of staff in congress from 1885 to 1976).
204See supra Part IV-C.
205See Patterson, supra note 113, at 251.

206Balutis, supra note 194, at 106, n.l. Phrase coined by Alan Rosenthal.
207See Patterson, supra note 113, at 239 ("[F]or most members being a state legislator
is a vocation. Two thirds ... in 1988 indicated they were full time legislators. At the same
time two thirds of the House members and three fourths of the senators reported
pursuing a second occupation as well").
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decentralized agencies; some central agencies are part of the legislative process
and even involved in making policy, others are very removed from the
process.208
Despite each state's unique political culture, commentators feel free to judge
the content, style and method, and quality of Ohio's legislative process and
record keeping by a Washington standard: if they are not the same, then Ohio's
must be inferior; or in the case of legislative history, non-existent. Even political
and government insiders in Ohio, including LSC staff and lobbyists, will say
there is no legislative history in Ohio, because the accepted definition of
legislative history, even for the insiders, is that which is maintained by
Congress. If other key aspects of political culture in Columbus differ from
Washington, should we expect the legislative history to be the same?
State organizations reflect and serve the culture of their own state and
political community.209 Yet, those within the states do not always appreciate
the utility of their uniqueness; instead they look to Washington as a measuring
stick to evaluate and describe themselves. I believe this is precisely what is
going on in Ohio when lawyers say "there is no legislative history in Ohio." I
believe they only mean that Ohio does not have the type or quantity of
legislative history as Congress. Meanwhile, for seventeen years Ohio courts
have recognized LSC documents as helpful in determining legislative intent.
VI. ACCESS AND AWARENESS
Forty years ago, some judges did not consider federal legislative history to
be sufficiently accessible to lawyers and the general public for the Supreme
Court in fairness to use it in their decisions.210 Today, access to federal
legislative history is not considered to be a problem.211 Is access to Ohio
legislative history a problem?
Many researchers attempt to approach state legislative history using federal
legislative history as their conceptual framework. Using the federal conceptual

208See generally Brian Weberg, Changes in Legislative Staff, in THE JOURNAL OF STATE
GOVERNMENT 190 (1989) (describing other staffing differentials such as degree of
centralization v. decentralization, degree of specialization, and degree of influence on
policy-making).
209See JoHNSTON, supra note 108, at 65 (describing institutional conservatism in the
Ohio legislature: "If it works, why fix it? is an Ohio attitude.").

210See United States v. Public Util. Comm'n ofCa.,345 U.S. 295,319-21 (1953) Oackson,
J., concurring) (Justice Jackson was concerned that some of the attorneys involved could
not view the legislative history that the majority relied upon until only a short time
before arguments).
211See Brudney, supra note 155, at 59, n.239, citing HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 1278-83
(lOth ed. 1958) (noting that even then, there were "three or more depository libraries for
U.S. government documents in every state and ... the Congressional Record and
committee reports are routinely collected in these libraries"). Today, Westlaw and LEXIS
make committee reports available to those who can purchase the service.
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framework may be an obstacle in the search for and recognition of Ohio
legislative history. The formats and quantity are different. Federal legislative
history seems more elegant, and the verbatim records allow the researcher the
luxury of finding a complete picture of the process of enactment of a bill.
Ohio legislative history in contrast is minimalist. The researcher will have to
resort to microfilm to recover many "hard copy" documents212 and microfilm
research can be tedious. Yet, Ohio legislative history seems to be available at
the same or similar locations as federal legislative history. Both are available
from on-line services.213 Both are preserved partially on microfilm. Both are
available at many of the same libraries.214 The vast quantity of federal history
in general does not guarantee that one will always find Congress's intent any
more than the scarcer quantity of Ohio history guarantees that one will not.
If it is commonly said that there is no legislative history in Ohio, and yet
meanwhile, Ohio courts are recognizing LSC bill analyses as legislative history,
some attorneys must be using these documents as part of their arguments.
Obviously, they know what it is and where to find it. Do they have a connection
to government, the legislature, or a lobbying group? Are they all based in
Columbus, or do they come from all over the state? Are they privileged in any
way? Access was not a problem for them, so it might be interesting to find out
more about their identities.
An exhaustive study of the identities of these attorneys is beyond the scope
of this paper but a brief empirical sample may be enlightening. I examined the
records of ten recent cases decided by the Ohio Supreme Court that cite LSC
bill analyses as legislative history to determine if any pattern was obvious from
the briefs.215
This sample is small and unscientific, more impressive for its variety than
for any clear patterns. Prosecutors, defense attorneys, city attorneys, and
attorneys in private practice from both large and small firms used LSC bill
analyses. The cases in which the LSC bill analyses were visible in the briefs
originated in urban areas in Ohio. Rural attorneys were not represented; rural
clients had urban firms representing them. Eight of the cases came from
counties with large cities or from suburban areas near large cities and two came
from rural counties. The two cases originating in rural counties had client

212See supra text accompanying note 38.
213See generally PuTNAM & ScHAEFGEN, supra note 146, at 247-74 (listing and evaluating
computer sites available in Ohio for legal research).

214See supra text accompanying note 38.
215J began with ten recent Ohio Supreme Court cases. Most, if not all, pre-1997 cases
are also excerpted in William Heaphy's memo. Using the docket numbers, I asked the
librarian at the Supreme Court library for the file containing the briefs for each case.
Then I proceeded to look for who was citing the LSC analysis. In most of the briefs, the
analysis was listed in the table of authorities of the brief or in the appendix to the brief.
In four cases, I could not find a citation to LSC, even by reading the briefs, but the court
mentioned LSC bill analyses in its decision anyway. In at least one of these, the statute
at issue, but not the LSC analysis, was discussed in the briefs.
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representation by lawyers based in urban law firms. In one rural case, it appears
that the court made use of a LSC bill analysis even though it did not appear in
the briefs. Based on this small unscientific sample, it appears that attorneys
from urban areas in Ohio might use LSC bill analyses more often than rural
attorneys.
In seven cases, the briefs contained mention of LSC documents. In two of
these seven cases, both sides used LSC bill analyses in their arguments. In five
cases, only one side used LSC bill analyses in their arguments. The attorneys
on each side carne from a variety of settings and included large firms, small
firms, and government. Seven of the cases were criminal in nature and four
were civil. No single judge wrote significantly more of the opinions than
another.
Three cases did not have any record of LSC documents in the briefs. Two of
these opinions were written by Justice Resnick. In Felton v. Felton, Southeastern
Ohio Legal Services represented appellant, with amici curiae briefs by
attorneys representing Ohio National Organization for Women, Ohio NOW
Education and Legal Fund, Action Ohio, Ohio Domestic Violence Network,
and National Center on Women and Family Law.216 Appellee was not
represented. In the later Resnick case, State v. Williams, appellant was
represented by the City Solicitor and City Prosecutor from Cincinnati. The third
case was a dispute between two state agencies, Office of Consumers Counsel v.
Public Utilities Commission ofOhio, and was written per curiarn.217 The attorneys
for appellant OCC were OCC staff attorneys; the attorneys for appellee PUCO
included assistant attorneys general and an attorney in private practice
represented McClure Telephone Company.
Of the remaining seven cases, the citations to LSC bill analyses were
relatively easy to find in the Table of Authorities or in the Appendix of the briefs,
either cited directly or through an earlier case that cited LSC analysis of a
pertinent statute.
In State v. Awkal, appellee was represented by assistant prosecuting attorneys
from Cuyahoga County; appellant was represented by McGinty, Gibbons &

216Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672,674 (Ohio 1997); State v. Williams,683 N.E.2d 1126
(Ohio 1997). The issues were related to new statutes intended to criminalize domestic
violence and specifically to authorize courts to issue protection orders. Williams cites
the court's use of LSC bill analysis in Felton to confirm the intent of the General
Assembly to criminalize the activities and authorize ex parse protection orders. The
briefs addressed the statutes but not the LSC bill analyses. Williams, 683 N.E.2d at 1128.
2170ffice of Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 638 N.E.2d 550,552 (Ohio
1994). At issue was whether the legislature intended to "dispense with the notice and
hearing requirements in the ratemaking process for small telephone companies," in
contrast to the traditional ratemaking process where ratepayers and the ace do
participate. rd. The LSC bill analysis confirms the legislative intent to not require notice
or hearing. The briefs addressed the statutes but not the LSC bill analysis.
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Hilow Co., L.P.A.218 The prosecutors cited an earlier case that quoted an LSC
Comment in a bill analysis. The opinion was written by Justice Pfeifer.
In State v. Economo, appellant was represented by Cuyahoga County assistant
prosecuting attorneys; appellee by Arthur P. Lambros and Thomas Paris of
Cleveland.219 Both sides used the same LSC bill analysis comment in their
briefs. The opinion was written by Justice Cook.
In State v. Moaning, appellant was represented by Montgomery County
prosecuting attorneys; appellee by Daniel E. Brinkman. A brief by counsel for
appellee was not in the file given to me by the Supreme Court librarian. The
prosecuting attorneys quoted LSC. The opinion was written by Justice
Stratton.220
In State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, relators seeking a writ of mandamus
were represented by Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Rishel, Myers &
Kopech, Esther S. Weissman Co., L.P.A. and amicus curiae by the Ohio
Academy of Trial Lawyers. Respondents were represented by the Attorney
General, the State Solicitor, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, and amici curiae
by Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease. The dissenting opinion by Justice Sweeney
mentioned the LSC bill analysis.221 Attorneys from Stewart Jaffy & Associates
used a twenty-page LSC bill analysis to illustrate the number of changes made
to existing law.

218Statev.Awkal,667N.E.2d 960,966 (Ohio 19%). The issue was the evidence of prior
calculation and design to commit a crime. The prosecution used a LSC bill analysis
Comment, cited in State v. Cotton, 381 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ohio 1978), to emphasize that
length of time did not determine whether an accused acted with prior calculation and
design. Awkal, 667 N.E.2d at 967.
219State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225,227 (Ohio 19%). At issue was the corroboration
requirement for the crime of sexual imposition. The state wanted to abolish the
requirement and emphasized that the intent of the legislation was unwise. The
defendant emphasized that the LSC Comment stated the corroboration rule is justified
because of the "ease with which this crime may be abused in prosecution." Id. at 229.
220State v. Moaning, 666 N.E.2d 1115-16 (Ohio 1996). At issue was whether the
legislature intended to prohibit a person who had been convicted of attempted drug
abuse from carrying a firearm under OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 2923.13(A)(3) which
prohibits having a weapon while under disability. The court used the LSC comment to
support its interpretation of the language of the statute, and as an "indication of the
legislature's intent to broaden the scope of the disability statute." Id. at 1116.
221State ex ref. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 585 (Ohio 1994). Two of
the four issues presented were whether the substantive changes in the workers
compensation system as part of a workers compensation appropriations bill violated 1)
the three-consideration provision and 2) the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution.
The dissent argued that "what started as a simple appropriations bill, now contained
massive substantive law changes to the workers' compensation system," and said the
"magnitude of the changes ... is demonstrated by the LSC Comparison of Current and
Prior Workers' Compensation Law ... [i]t takes twenty pages to list the changes made
by the bill." These facts were part of the dissent's argument that "what occurred here is
a classic example of the 'logrolling' forbidden by the one-subject rule .... " Id. at 601-02.
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In State v. D'Ambrosio, a death penalty case, appellee was represented by
prosecuting attorneys from Cuyahoga County and appellant was represented
by John F. Norton and John H. Higgans. Attorneys for the appellant cited State
v. Cotton, which quoted a LSC bill analysis.222
In Harris v. Atlas Single-Ply Systems, appellants were represented by the
Attorney General with amicus curiae by Ross, Brittain & Schonberg Co. for
Ohio ABC Inc., and appellee by Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease with amicus
curiae by Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff for the Ohio State Building
and Construction Trades Council. The concurring opinion written by Justice
Douglas cited the LSC Summary.223 Amicus curiae for appellants cited Harris
v. Van Hoose that used a LSC bill analysis to argue legislative intent.
In In re Annexation of 311.8434 Acres of Land v. Lewis, appellees were
represented by Schwartz, Manes & Ruby, a Cincinnati firm; the appellants by
Sheldon A. Strand, and Leslie S. Landen, Middleton Law Directors. Both sides
used LSC bill analyses in their briefs, but cited different house bills for different
statutes. The opinion was written by Justice Holmes.224
Slightly different results could be construed from a LEXIS search that
included all Ohio courts and reported and unreported cases. These came from
a much wider range of counties than found in this sample of ten.225 Of the lower

222State v. D' Ambrosio,616 N.E.2d 909,912 (Ohio 1993). An issue was the appellant's
prior calculation and design. The court quoted a LSC comment quoted in State v. Cotton,
381 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ohio 1978) in its discussion of the requirements for prior calculation
and design. Id. at 918.
223Harris v. Atlas Single-Ply Sys., 593 N.E.2d 1376-77 (Ohio 1992). At issue was
whether the language of the statute of limitations regarding unpaid minimum wages
could be applied in an action by an employee for the payment of prevailing wages and
thus require that the Department of Industrial Relations bring an action on behalf of
employees within two years. The concurring opinion quoted a LSC summary cited in
Harris v. Van Hoose, 550 N.E.2d 461,463 (Ohio 1990) and concluded that any limitation
periods in the statute applied only when a prevailing wage law violation existed and
so did not apply to this case. Id. at 1378.
224Jn reAnnexation of 311.8434 Acres of Land v. Lewis, 597 N.E.2d 460, 461 (Ohio
1992). At issue was whether township trustees could appeal the approval of a
landowner's petition for annexation. Appellants used the bill analysis of H. B. 412, and
appellees used the bill analysis for H.B. 175. The court used the LSC analysis of H.B. 175
to find the purpose of the amendment to section 505.62 of the Ohio Revised Code and
found that the amendment only conferred standing on township trustees to appeal
denial of an annexation petition and was a response to the court's denial of that standing
in In reAppeal of Bass Lake Community, Inc., 449 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio 1983), which did
not change the procedure for allowance of a landowner's petition for annexation.
Landowners were provided broader appeal rights under Chapter 2506 of the Ohio
Revised Code. Appellants claimed there was a conflict between the procedures. The
court of appeals had ruled that the legislature provided concurrent remedies. Lewis, 597
N.E.2d at 462.

2251 conducted a boolean search for all cases in all Ohio courts in which the phrase
"Legislative Service C' occurred. This type of search will retrieve any case w:here ~SC
is mentioned at all and yielded a total of 213 cases from 1958 through 1997, mcludmg
54 Supreme Court cases, 93 appellate court cases, 56 unreported appellate court cases,
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court cases, urban counties were more heavily represented than rural counties,
but rural counties still were represented. There were urban counties, suburban,
and rural counties in the search results. Of the reported appellate cases,
approximately 25% were from rural county districts, the remaining 75% from
urban or suburban counties. Of the unreported appellate cases, slightly fewer
than 20% came from rural county districts; the remaining 80% from urban or
suburban counties. Of the ten miscellaneous cases, one-third came from rural
counties.226
To put this in context, one must remember that Ohio has few purely rural
counties or appellate court districts; it has five major industrial cities, a state
capital that is larger in population than any of the industrial cities, and
numerous small industrial cities.227 It is arguable whether there are any truly
remote rural areas in Ohio, except possibly southeastern Ohio. But the Fourth
Appellate District was relatively well represented in the LEXIS search results
with a total of fourteen appellate cases.228It is possible that rural attorneys do
not have equal access to Ohio legislative history; they may have to rely on
on-line services such as Hannah Information Systems for state legislative
history (and LEXIS and Westlaw for federal legislative history) if they do not
have time to drive one to three hours to Columbus and back for research. A

and 10 miscellaneous court cases.
226I classified collar counties surrounding urban counties as suburban rather than
rural. I defined "rural" as not urban or suburban. Of ninety-three reported appellate
court cases, twenty-two came from rural counties; of fifty-six unreported cases, nine
came from rural counties; of ten miscellaneous cases, three came from rural counties.
227Knepper, supra note 191, at 3 ("Ohio ... has an extraordinary number of industrial
cities. Prior to World War II, it had more cities with over 100,000 population than did
any state, and they were widely distributed across its area, with only the southeast
quadrant lacking a major city. Twenty smaller cities, in the 25,000 to 85,000 population
range, were also widely distributed").
228The LEXIS search yielded thirteen reported cases and one unreported case citing
LSC from the Fourth Appellate District, which includes Pickaway, Ross, Highland,
Adams, Pike, Scioto, Hocking, Vinton, Jackson, Lawrence, Gallia, Meigs, Athens, and
Washington Counties. See PuTNAM & Sc:HAEFGEN, supra note 146, at 129 (Court of
Appeals District Map). Of Ohio's twelve appellate districts, only four do not include a
county that borders or contains a city. One, the Fifth District, consists of fifteen counties,
and includes some collar counties of Columbus, and the smaller city of Mansfield, in
addition to rural areas such as Holmes County. The Fifth District had a total of six
appellate cases citing LSC. The Seventh District in central eastern Ohio had six cases
citing LSC. The Third District, in northwestern Ohio, a predominantly agricultural area,
between but not including the Dayton and Toledo areas, had only two cases. Other
factors, such as the opinions of the judges and their clerks about Ohio legislative history,
may affect the use of LSC analyses, because location and rural nature of a district do not
consistently correlate to a demonstrated lack of access. This is very rough data and I
relied on my general knowledge of Ohio to determine which districts were rural and
non-rural.
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superficial look at these search results does not provide such a simplistic
answer.229
It would be useful at another time to look at all the briefs for all the cases in
which LSC bill analyses are used, including counties that are not major urban
area. The subject of access is ripe for further research because the preliminary
data is inconclusive.
VII. CONCLUSION

It is difficult to come to conclusions about the reasons for the gap between
the use of legislative history by Ohio courts, and its official acknowledgement
in scholarly articles. Ohio's version of legislative history might filter into
general awareness from the practicing attorney up to the scholarly writers
rather than the other way around. The conservatism I described as part of
Ohio's political culture may also influence lawyers's statements and
observations about Ohio legislative history.
We could be on the verge of an upward swing in awareness.230 A few things
are different now. The commentaries that use LSC as evidence of legislative
intent, even without an explicit recognition of the source as legislative history,
have increased recently.231 A new Ohio Legal Research Guide will clarify for
many where to find what is available in Ohio.232 Lawyers may be taking baby
steps towards recognition of Ohio's unique sources. Moving slowly and
cautiously towards change is not an unusual phenomenon in Ohio.
I have answered some of the questions I raised in the introduction of this
article. Commentators and attorneys have relied on a limited definition of
legislative history; I have tried to persuade you to expand your definition.
There is at least a lack of perceptiveness, if not a misunderstanding, about how
the political culture of a state influences its institutions and their operations. I
cannot find any solid evidence to suggest that some lawyers have inside
information that others do not have equal access to, although that is a question
that deserves more research. It should be apparent by now that many are
ignoring what is both obvious and available, because of concrete thinking, or
cultural ethnocentrism, or a federal bias, or because they equate quantity with

229Cf, Knepper, supra note 191, at 12. Rural Ohio is well-represented in the General
Assembly, from 1945 to the 1990's. "Ohio's major cities were also hampered by
underrepresentation in the state legislature ... [T]he 'cornstalk brigade' was exerting a
disproportionate influence on state spending." See also supra text accompanying note
211.
230There were six Supreme Court cases in 1997 citing LSC bill analysis, five in 1996,
none in 1995, three in 1994, one in 1993, three in 1992, nine in 1991, four in 1990, two in
1989, one in 1988, two in 1987, none in 1985, one in 1984, four in 1982, three in 1981, and
five in 1980, including Meeks.
231See supra text accompanying note 22.
232PUTNAM & SCHAEFGEN, supra note 146.
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quality.233 Are we merely in a time lag before the legal community comes to
agreement? That remains to be seen.
I have tried to put together the pieces of the political and legislative puzzle
that is Ohio. Some pieces of the puzzle are still missing, particularly those that
would fill in the gaps about access and awareness. One part of the picture is
clear, though; there is legislative history in Ohio.

233 Alternatively, because most law schools do not require students to take a
Legislation course, many lawyers do not understand federal or state legislative process,
or the various theories and methods of statutory interpretation, as well as they
understand the common law. See generally Otto Hetzel, Statutory and Constitutional

Interpretation: Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills in the Classroom and the Courtroom,
48 U. Pm. L. REv. 663 (1987)(arguing that all law students need a course that teaches
legislative process, explains the behavioral norms of legislative institutions, and
analyzes theories of statutory interpretation).
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